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Abstract 
This paper examines game theory in general and the 
Colonel Blotto problem of force allocation in particular. 
,A, 
The problem is expanded to include additional information of 
varying reliability concerning the opponent's intentions. A 
Bayesian decision analysis solution is advanced and compared 
' 
with the strict game theory solution. The technique uses 
information qualified with probabi 1 i ty assessments of its 
veracity. While the problem discussed is a two player zero 
sum game, it is easily extended to non-zero sum multiple 
player game with applications including military deployment, 
business competitions, international affairs and stock 
trading. 
discussed. 
The limitations of such an approach are also 
1 
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Game Theory 
As Developed by Von Neumann [1972] game theory seeks to 
find optimal strategies to a highly structured strategic 
,. 
competition with one or more players. The II game 11 • IS 
carefully defined by rules which specify the legal moves of 
all players, a payoff function or matrix corresponding to 
those moves, the amount of information available to each 
t-- player (information consists of the results of • previous 
moves), the number of rounds to be played, and the role of 
chance in determining the outcome. 
two player coin matching game. 
For example consider a 
Moves available to both players consist of re\teal ing a 
head or tai 1 side of a coin. The coins are then compared 
and if the coins are both heads or tails then player one 
wins one round, otherwise player two wins the round. The 
payoff matrix for player one would therefore consist of (1). 
Player 1 
H 
T 
Player 2 
H T 
1 -1 
-1 1 
1 -1 
or 
-1 1 ( 1 ) 
This type game is termed zero sum because any gains made 
by one player are at the expense of the other player as the 
amount of payoff is fixed. Thus player two seeks to 
" 
minimize the total score while player one seeks to maximize 
2 
the score. A non zero sum game has at least one move for 
which the sum of the gains for all the players is not zero. 
An example of this would be a state lottery in which a fixed 
amount of money is .removed before the pot is redistributed 
to the participants. 
A strategy is defined as a plan of moves which covers all 
counter moves by opponents over the course of the entire 
game. Selecting one move which played each turn for the 
entire game is termed pure strategy. A mixed strategy is 
probability based selection of a move for any given round. 
,,.,,. '"\ 
This is don~by __ assigning a probabi 1 i ty (we_ight) to each 
possible move (the sum of all moves must naturally be 1.0) 
and then randomizing. Game theory seeks to discover the 
best strategy for a game which is done by applying the 
minmax theorem. 
For two player zero-sum games with a finite number of 
moves, the payoff function can always be represented as a 
matrix A with a being the result of move i by player 1 and ij 
move j by player 2. Consider a payoff function composed of 
matrix 2. 
3 
-1 
1 2 
0 -2 
2 -1 ·1 
Max Max Max 
3 1 2 
3 
Min= 1 
Min= 2 
Min=-1 
(2) 
,---.. 
' ' \ 
Quite clearly, there is no reason why player one would 
choose row two instead of row one if he, as we assume, wants 
to maximize his winnings, because for all the columns the 
first row yields superior results than the second. Thus row 
one is said to "dominate" row two and'the second row can be 
eliminated without changing the solution to the problem 
leaving matrix (3). 
3 1 
2 -1 
2 
1 
Max Max Max 
3 1 2 
Min= 1 
Min=-1 
Now it can be seen from player two's 
(3) 
• view (recal 1 he 
desires the lowest score), there is no reason why he would 
choose column one over column two as his move. Again it is 
termed that column two "dominates" column one and can be 
safely eliminated leaving matrix (4) .. , 
-~ ,: 
1 
-1 
2 
1 
Max Max 
1 2 
Min= 1 
Min=-1 
(4) 
Likewise column one dominates column two to reveal (5). 
1 Min= 1 
-1· Min=-1 
Max 
1 
(5) 
Finally row one dominates the new row two to leave (6) . 
. ':' ( 
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. /J 
( . 
[ 1 ] Min= 1 
Max 
1 
(6) 
Thus the problem reduces itself to player one choosing 
row one and player two choosing co!umn two. From the above 
reasoning, it can be said a 12 is in the best interests of 
both players or an equilibrium point. If both players 
choose their optimum move, they can expect the result of the 
game ("value") to be one. If one player chooses a move 
other than his optimum while his opponent remains with his 
optimum, he will receive less than the value of the game. 
However the problem given above is a rather contrived 
example to illustrate the concept of "dominance" and how it 
can be used to solve for the equilibrium point. Such a 
procedure of eliminating rows and columns 1s only the 
starting point for more complex problems. 
Consider if player one chooses a strategy and announces 
it before player two has chosen his. Player two would then 
logically select the column with the minimum value. 
Therefore player one would have selected the row with the 
maximum row for the minimum column (the 11 maxmin 11 ). If the 
roles were reversed and player two choose first then player 
one would naturally select the row which gave the maximum 
for the column selected by two. Therefore two would select 
the column with the minimum of (the the • maximum rows 
"minmax"). If the minmax equals the maxmin then that point 
5 
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ls the equilibrium point (or as it ls termed in pure 
strategy "saddle point"). It can be quickly located because 
it is the largest value in its column and the lowest point 
in its row. More formally the saddle point consists 
maximinj ~ minjmaxi. If max1minj=minimaxj then there exists 
a pure strategy . for both players such that if player one 
chooses his, he is guaranteed ~t least the value of the game 
and if player two chooses his correct pure'strategy then he 
is guaranteed at most the value of the game. However if the 
minmax does not equal the maxmin then no pure strategy 
solutions exist to the game and a mixed solution • lS 
required. 
Before proceeding onto mixed solution games, a more 
formal description of what constitutes a mixed strategy is 
required of mixed games themselves. In a mixed two player 
zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix A is NxM, player 
one selects a weight vector of xl .. M and player two likewise 
chooses v1_ .N then the payoff for the two strategies would 
then be equation 7 (James [1967]). 
n m [[ 
J=1 1=1 
a .. x. y. = V IJ.lJ xy (7) 
The minmax theorem for mixed strategies which is true for 
all two player zero-sum games can be expressed as 
equation 8. 
• 1n 
MaximumX (Minimttm'x* V xt=Minimum y(Maximum1 YV xf (8) 
6 
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This important result al lows for the immediate checking 
of a solution but does not specify a technique in finding 
it. While many methods for finding the optimum values were 
developed during the early years of game theory (before the 
.. 
advent of cheap computers) for finding the optimum values 
such as graphical, guess and verify, mapping methods and 
iterative approximations, most of these are not serviceable 
for large problems as outlined in Dresher [1981]. Because 
of game theory's nature of maximizing and minimizing, linear 
programing on computers has proven to be very successful and 
has become the standard technique. 
1 
I 
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Private Information 
The classical game theoretic model of complete (C-Game) 
information available to all the players was found to be too 
great a simplification form many applications. A seminal 
work by Harsanyi [1967] outlined a technique to convert all 
games with incomplete ihformat ion (I-Game) to their 
corresponding C-Game. The types of information unavailable 
to one or more players include the payoff function or even 
the strategies available. This "Bayesian equivalent" C-Game 
of an I-Game is based upon using subjective probabi 1 i ty 
distributions for approximations. 
In applications, the descriptions of the probability 
distributions rely upon the judgments of experts. Such a 
dependence upon the human assessment of prdbabilities makes 
the model less reliable particularly in cases with very 
small or very large likelihoods CC.Smart [1982]). Another 
problem encountered is the common difficulty in recognizing 
the difference between joint and conditional probabilities 
which one study found even experts err in. 
general forecasting of all types difficult. 
This makes in 
Nevertheless much attention has been focused by 
economists and others on I-Games which they refer to as 
"private information" games. Such interest has concentrated 
, $ 
on auctions and bids (Mookherjee [1985]). However neither 
8 ~ 
r 
C-games nor I-Games cover the problem of possessing 
information concerning the other side's intentions. This is 
not a critic ism of game theory, as Von Neumann pointedly 
ruled out using such knowledge as part of the definition of 
game theory. 
However such a ban limits the application of the theory. 
For example consider a contest between IBM and a smal 1 
company (cal led an 11 0EM 11 Original Equipment Manufacturer) 
which markets their own version of an IBM memory board. 
While IBM may utilize the game theory quite well to model 
its competition against all OEM's as a group, for the 
particular OEM's perspective which is totally dependent upon 
IBM's actions for 
inadequate. 
its own survival, game theory • IS 
While the above 1 ife and death struggle can be 
approximated by allowing different payoff functions for both 
sides, it would st i 11 not properly represent the situation 
of a one and a half player game. Related to this problem of 
incorporating the not ion of dominance is the problem of 
offense/defense as a who'Je. 
Game theory envisions a contest such as when the national 
television networks establishing their initial fall 
schedules. That is to say, the decisions are made in secret 
and (almost) simultaneously revealed. Al:J competitors are 
equally determined to capture the various ·time slots they 
l 
compete • 1n. However in a large number of contests, the 
9 
/) 
decisions are made asynchronisticly and one or more players 
sets the tone by his • aggression. One player if only 
psychologically assumes the role of defender and reacts to 
the moves or conjectured moves of his more aggressive 
I 
opponent. The reasons for this behavior vary but it is a 
common strategy of either apathy or waiting for the opponent 
to tire. 
Game theory is thus a method of concentrating upon the 
.f' 
opponent's and one's own capabilities rather than the 
intentions of the opponent. This is perfectly satisfactory 
if the game is synchronistic, both sides are "bl ind", and 
neither side dominates too greatly. However alternative 
techniques should be used to better represent the problem if 
the above do not apply. 
0 • 
J 
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Colonel Blotto 
As originally described by McDonald [1949] Colonel 
Blotto is given a test of competence in a combat situation. 
He is told the battle consists of four forts lying • 1n 
separate passes to which he must allocate his resources of 
four combat units. Opposing him is a force of three units. 
He must commit his units to each pass prior to the battle 
and no adjustment of forces is allowed during the battle. 
In other words his task is confined to allocation only. 
Combat is resolved strictly in terms of simple 
arithmetic: the victor at any one pass is the one with the 
most uni ts. The payoff function consists of one point for 
each fort captured and one point for each enemy unit 
destroyed. For example if Blotto's were allocated [2 1 0 1] 
and his opponent used [ 1 2 0 O] then in pass number one 
Blotto captures the fort and destroys one of his opponent's 
units. While in pass two, hfs opponent captures the second 
fort and Blot to loses a unit. In the third pass, neither 
side committed any units.so the result served neither s_ide. 
Finally in the fourth pass, Blotto captures the fort. The 
payoff for Blotto then becomes 2-2+0+1=1 (and therefore -1 
for his opponent as this is quite clearly a zero-sum game). 
For Blotto there are only five possible pure strategies: 
he may allocate four units to one pass (1-4's), three to one 
11 
'5'1 
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pass and one unit to another ( 3 and 1), two groups of two 
units each (2 and 2), two groups of one each and one group 
of two (1 and 1 and 2), and finally four groups of one 
(4-l's). The first case of 1-4's was banned in the original 
problem to enable a simple graphical solution of the 
problem. However following Haywood [1951], the full Blotto 
game was reformulated. Blot to' s opponent has three pure 
strategies available to him: (2 and 1), (1-3's) and (3-1's). 
Because neither Blotto nor his opponent have any 
knowledge of each other's intentions, the assignment of a 
group to a particular pass within a strategy is random (i.e 
if Blotto is using a pure strategy of 1-4's then there is no 
rational reason for preferring to send the unit to one pass 
over another). Therefore in calculating the payoff matrix 
an average al 1 possible combinations is used. For the 
complete game the payoff matrix as found by Haywood is: 
-
4-l's 
3&1 
2&2 
1-4's 
2&1&1 
2&1 
0.00 
0.75 
1.00 
0.25 
0.50 
I 
1-3 
1.00 
0.50 
-0.50 
1.00 
0.25 
3-l's 
1.00 
0.50 
2.00 
-0.50 
1. 50 
r i 
. 
. . 
There is obviously no saddle poin-t in this problem but 
I 
the mixed solution has been found to be [1/5, 4/5, 0, 0, O] 
12 
while his oppon~nt uses (2/5, ~/5, 1/5] or (6/5, 8/5, 1/5] 
or any linear combination of the two. The value of the game 
can then be calculated at 0.6. 
Considered a classic game theory problem, Colonel Blotto 
attracted a great deal of attention when it was first 
published by McDonald based as it was on the work by the 
Princeton mathematicians Charles Winsor and John Tukey. 
Many different variations of the game were explored in the 
early 1950's including games with infinite strategies (i.e. 
the deployment of units need not be integers]. However 
because of its simplicity, it fell into disfavor as more 
exotic non-zero sum games became the focus (Shubik [1975]). 
Today it remains of interest primarily to military 
applications where the zero sum nature is compatible. · A 
recent work [Grotte] used the Colonel Blotto problem to 
"evaluate equal cost forces of alternative carrier designs 
in the presence role". During peace time, • carriers 
"project II power in areas by their mere existence in areas. 
The study found such a situation could well be described in 
a Blotto format. 
However the rest of this paper will deal with a 
modification of the original problem to explore decisions 
based upon anticipating enemy moves. The extension is the 
inclusion of one spy in each pass .who reports the number of 
troops he believes the enemy is sending into the pass he • lS 
watching. This report • received • to Blotto's IS prior 
13 
\ 
The BLOTTO Program 
The BLOTTO program calculates the average score for a 
player using Bayesian decision analysis over 10,000 passes 
against a simulated player using random moves. While in the 
game theory solution of the traditional problem, individual 
passes are ignored and only the combination of groups are 
examined (i.e 2&1 not (2 1 0 0] or [1 2 0 0]). However 
BLOTTO is sensitive to permutations and so a fuller payoff 
matrix is required to handle all the possible cases. 
Instead of the normal 5x3 grid an expanded 35x20 is used 
( see figure 1). 
BLOTTO runs the 10,000 passes for all combinations of the 
four spies varying from 0.0 to 1.0 with an interval of 0.1. 
While combinations rather than permutations are used to 
reduce the number of cases used, the moves available to 
BLOTTO's opponent are symmetrical in respect to the passes. 
There are 995 combinations required to generate al 1 the 
possible values. Each round consists of • SIX steps: 
selecting the opponent's move, distorting the spies's 
• 
reports of those moves, creating a likelihood function based 
upon the reports, calculating the expected score for each of 
Blotto's moves, selecting Blotto's move with the highest 
expected score, and updating the statistics for the round. 
15 
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Figure 1 
The complete Blotto payoff function 
Blotto's Opponents' Moves 
3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 
BLOT. 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 \ 
4000 4 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 0 
3100 1 3 3 3 0 1 1 2 1 2 -1 -2 -2 0 -1 0 1 0 0 1 
3010 1 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -2 0 1 
3001 1 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 -1 -2 1 0 -2 -1 
2200 -2 2 0 0 2 3 3 2 1 2 -2 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 
2110 -1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 0 -1 -1 -1 0 1 0 -1 1 2 
2101 -1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 0 -1 -1 1 0 -1 2 1 -1 0 
2020 -2 0 2 0 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 -2 0 2 1 
2011 -1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 
2002 -2 0 0 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 -2 
1300 -1 0 -2 -2 3 1 1 0 -1 0 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 
1210 0 1 -1 -1 1 2 2 -1 0 1 -1 1 1 1 2 3 0 -1 1 2 
1201 0 1 -1 -1 1 2 2 1 0 -1 -1 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 -1 0 
1120 0 -1 1 -1 -1 2 0 1 2 1 0 1 -1 1 2 1 -1 1 3 2 
1111 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
1102 0 -1 -1 1 -1 0 2 1 2 1 0 -1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 -1 
1030 -1 -2 0 -2 0 1 -1 3 1 0 1 2 0 3 1 0 1 3 2 1 
1021 0 -1 1 -1 1 2 0 1 2 -1 2 3 1 1 2 -1 -1 1 1 0 
1012 0 -1 -1 1 1 0 2 -1 2 1 2 1 ~3 -1 2 1 0 1 1 -1 
1003 -1 -2 -2 0 0 -1 1 0 1 3 1 0 2 0 1 3 1 2 3 1 
0400 0 1 -1 -1 2 0 0 -1 -2 -1 4 2 2 1 0 1 0 -1 -1 0 
0310 1 2 0 0 3 1 1 -2 -1 0 1 3 3 0 1 2 -1 -2 0 1 
0301 1 2 0 0 3 1 1 0 -1 -2 1 3 3 2 1 0 1 0 -2/}1 
0220 1 2 2 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 -2 2 0 2 3 2 -2 0 2 1 
0211 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 -1 0 -1 -1 1 1 1 2 1 0 -1 -1 0 
0202 1 2 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 0 -2 0 2 2 3 2 1 2 0 -2 
0130 1 0 2 0 -2 1 -1 3 1 0 -1 0 -2 3 1 0 1 3 2 1 
0121 2 1 3 1 -1 2 0 1 2 -1 0 1 -1 1 2 -1 -1 1 1 0 
0112 2 1 1 3 -1 0 2 -1 2 1 0 -1 1 -1 2 1 0 1 1 -1 
0103 1 0 0 2 -2 -1 1 0 1 3 -1 -2 0 0 1 3 1 2 3 1 
0040 0 -1 1 -1 -1 0 -2 2 0 -1 0 1 -1 2 0 -1 4 2 1 0 
0031 1 0 2 0 0 1 -1 3 1 -2 1 2 0 3 1 -2 1 3 0 -1 
0022 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 2 2 0 3 <.o -2 2 2 -2 
... 0013 1 0 0 2 0. -1 1 -2 1 3 1 0 2 -2 1 3 -1 0 3 1 
0004 0 -1 -1 1 -1 -2 0 -1 0 2 0 -1 1 -1 0 2 0 1 2 4 
16 
... ,, 
To select the opponent's move, one permutation is chosen 
,. 
at random from a list of the twenty moves available to him. 
For each spy if a random number is higher than his rating, 
instead of reporting the correct number of units (0-3) 
entering the pass, he reports a randomly assigned one from 
the remaining. 
The likelihood function for each move is the a posteriori 
probabilities from Bayes' Theorem using the combined spy 
reports as the conditional probabilities. In the theorem as 
expressed in equation 9, P(Move. I AMM) is the e. posteriori 
1 
probability that Move. was selected given that a move was 
1 
made. P(Move.) is the probability of Move 
1 1 being chosen 
given no additional information which· in the Blotto problem 
is always 1/20. 
P(Move. I AMM) = 
1 
P(Move.) P(AMM IMove.) 
1 1 
m 
[ P(Movei) P(AMM 
1=1 
I Move. ) 
1 
(9) 
The spies reports (a vector R[l .. Number of forts]) and their 
associated truth rating (a vector T[l .. Number of forts]) 
combined to form P(AMM I Move.) for each move. (a vector 
1 1 
M.[1 .. Number of forts]) using the following algorithm: 1 
P(AMM I Move.) =1 
1 
for j:=1 to number of forts do 
if (Mi[j]9R[j]) then 
P(AMM I Move.)=P(AMM IMove.)*T[j] 
1 1 
else 
P(AMM Move.)=P(AMM IMove.)*(1-T[j]); 
1 1 
17 
... 
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The likelihood functions are then used to estimate the 
outcome for each possible BLOTTO moves using equation 10. 
m 
Score Blotto Movej= L P(Opp.Move11AMM)*Payoff[j,i] (10) 
1=1 
BLOTTO then selects the move with highest expected score, 
cross references it with his opponent's actual move to 
produce the score for the round which then added to the 
., 
total for that spy combination. In an earlier version of 
the program, the spies ratings were estimated by their 
success record which required updating at the end of each 
round. However because of the number of rounds involved, 
such approximations were not important. 
18 
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Asseslng Intelligence Sources 
The chief difflcul ty in applying the Bayesian decision 
making process to most useful applications is the 
requirement to assess the sources of information both 
individually and collectively. The simple case analyzed had 
~ 
reduced the problem to its final state of a vector 
indicating the probabilities of the opponent's selected 
moves. However in most cases, determining the reliability 
of an information source is a difficult task. Historically 
this is a problem which has long disturbed decision makers. 
In the Second World War, the successor to Admiral Canaris as 
head of the Abwehr (German Civilian Intelligence), kept a 
1 ist of agents with simple notations next to each 1 ike 
11 re 1 i able 11 , 11 tested and re 1 i able 11 , 11 nothing special 11 , 11 good 
reports 11 , and 11 useful II as was recorded in the captured 
German archives (Farago [1971]). From these lists he could 
get a quick summary of their performance over the years. 
This qualitative notation if properly systematized could be 
incorporated using Zadeth's fuzzy logic. 
A simple averaging of the accuracy of the information 
reliability is a straight forward solution which has the 
merit of being easy to implement. Such a method was 
originally implemented in BLOTTO where if the spy reports 
the information exactly correct, his score would be.updated 
;; 
19 
Thus his accuracy is his score divided by the 
number of reports he filed. However there are two possible 
requirements of such a simplification - the illlormation must 
be of equal importance and the source's reliability • lS 
assumed to remain constant over time. 
The former concern is only important if the data itself 
is heterogeneous. In the BLOTTO program each source 
reported only on his pass, however a source may have 
knowledge of multiple areas with unequ~l success rates 
(which is quite likely in most applications). For example 
the source might be able to report quite accurately on his 
own pass but much less so on neighboring passes because his 
1 ine of sight is obscured. One solution is to maintain 
separate categories with corresponding rates of success for 
each of them. 
In real applications, the reliability of the information 
from sources is often a function of time - not constant as 
in the BLOTTO program. Non-human sources may malfunction to 
produce incorFect information while human sources will vary 
in accuracy as a normal course. To produce time weighted 
statistics many equations could be used but equation 9 has 
been proven to be useful in predicting cpu (central 
processing unit) bursts (Peterson [1985]) based upon 
previous results which is a similar problem. 
( 11) 
20 ,. 
In the equation, rr is the previous weighted average with 
n 
r n being the accuracy of the. latest report and Iln+l being 
' 
the current weighted average. The constant« represents the 
weighting factor which varies from Oto 1 but is usually set 
l 
at 0.5 for predicting cpu bursts. The value of« would be 
set to reflect the amount of volatility in the system. 
The underlying assumption for the preceding discussion 
was that the information could be checked as being true or 
false (although the above formula allows any number for r ). 
n 
However in many cases such a binary judgment is misleading. 
Consider in the Colonel Blotto case if an informant usually 
errs in estimating the size of the enemy's units going to a 
particular pass by a margin of 1, this provides more than 
someone who is wrong within a range of 1.5 but it would not 
be reflected in the equations. A more sophisticated 
approach would also consider the standard deviations of the 
sources (time weighted). 
Furthermore particular pat terns might be inherent • 1n a 
information source's reports. For example a source might 
overestimate the actions of an opponent on one report and on 
the next he might compensate by underestimating. Or in a 
more complex case, he might be more 1 ikely to report some 
type of actions more carefully than others. To filter 
through what could quickly become a tangled mess, perhaps 
the best solution would be an expert system tailored to the 
21 
problem environment. 
22 
Disadvantages to Intention Based Schemes 
.... 
One of the beautiful aspects of game theory is that its 
actual choice of a move is unpredictable. While the 
opponent of someone using game theory may.be fully cognizant 
of how his adversary is selecting his mixed strategy, he can 
not use that knowledge to improve his score beyond the value 
of the game. Unfortunately the same does not hold for 
decision making processes based upon intentions. 
In the world of international affairs, along with 
intelligence gathering • agencies have evolved 
counter-intel 1 igence agencies and in the last fifty years 
disinformation (or 11 active measures 11 ) departments. These 
departments seek to send misleading or completely false 
information to their opponents. Perhaps the most acclaimed 
was the British XX ( "double cross 11 ) group run by Sir John 
Masterman during World War II (Read [1985]) Their technique 
was to 11 turn 11 captured enemy agents and have them send 
carefully prepared doctored or false messages. Great 
efforts were made to maintain the credibility or the turned 
agents by including some true and useful information. The 
first and greatest XX agent, Arthur George Owens was held in 
such esteem by the Germans that he received the Iron Cross 
ror his actions (Farago [1971]). 
But such a world of smoke and mirrors is not a typical 
problem where the stakes are not played at such a high 
23 
stake. To return to the problem of an OEM versus IBM, it ls 
not likely such elaborate deceptions would utilized. 
However in a contest between more equal competitors, if both 
sides were basing their decisions upon their estimates of 
their opponents intentions, a circular logic evolves ( in 
which game theory would be more appropriate). 
Another real danger in using Bayesian decision analysis 
is its deterministic nature. If an opponent realizes how 
his adversary is selecting his moves, a moderate amount of 
dinformation could be applied and he can then maximize his 
gains as he knows how his opponent will react to a 
particular stimulus. To guard against such actions, a mixed 
strategy similar to game theory could be implemented. For 
example, given that Bayesian analysis reduces the payoff 
matrix to a probability vector ijxl then instead of selecting 
the move with the maximum gain (or • • m1n1mum loss). a 
probabi 1 i ty vector P Nxl ( 10) could be used as the base for 
randomizing. 
A. 
P. 1 --
1 
N 
L A. (12) 1 
1=1 
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The Results 
As mentioned earlier, the game theory solution to the 
Colonel Blotto problem is the vector (0. 2, 0. 8, 0, 0, 0] 
which gtlarantees at least the value of the game of 0. 6. 
which is against an opponent using his optimum strategy. In 
the modified Blotto problem as examined in the present 
simulation the opponent picks randomly from the move 
permutations whose equivalent in the normal game would be 
-\;_ 
the m1~x-e-r--s-.trategy [0.2, 0.6, 0.2]. However the value of a 
game played with such a strategy against Blot to using his 
optimal mixed strategy is also 0.6. 
The ful 1 results sorted by average score of the BLOTTO 
program are included in the appendix in tabular format. 
However in figure 2, 3 and 4 an extract from eleven spy 
combinations are displayed. Each group consists of three 
spies with identical ratings and a fourth which varies from 
0 to 1 (i.e. [ 0 0 0 0], [ 0 0 0 0. 1], ... ) to show the effect 
of slightly better information upon the average score. 
As would be expected the lowest score for each group is 
"'' 
around 0. 4 where the fourth spy's reports are random. If 
the spy can be relied upon to be consistently wrong it 
provides information about which move is NOT likely to have 
been selected. This ls particularly apparent in figure 2 
where a similar pattern emerges in cases with low spy 
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ratings. 
In the medium probability groups of figure 3 a far more 
unusual pattern occurs at the point where the fourth spy's 
reports become on average random. For the 0.4, 0.5, and 
0.7 groups, the value peaks higher than either of the 
neighboring points while in the 0. 6 case the value • IS a 
lower value as seen in figure 2 (but more dramatic). The 
cause of this abnormality can be trace to the finite number 
of moves to both sides and thus a discontinuous payoff 
matrix. 
In the fourth figure, a flattening of the line occurs as 
the influence of one spy is not very significant as the 
group's level is in the upper regions. It is especially 
clear in the 1.0 group (perfect knowledge) in which the 
input of one other member is irrelevant and so the line is 
completely flat. 
The highest BLOTTO score was naturally the one with 
perfect knowledge which sets the cei 1 ing of· a perfect game 
with the opponent mix of [0.2 0.6 0.2] at 3.2. The lowest 
BLOTTO program score was 0.808 for spies with the ratings of 
0.3, 0.3, 0.3, and 0.4 which is still greater than the game 
theory score of 0.6. However game theory will never give a 
score lower than O on any round while BLOTTO is not risk 
adverse and will sometimes get a score as low as -2 (which 
is an important fact for one round competitions). In fact 
in the case of [0.3'0.6 0.6 0.6] the score -2 was the result 
26 
in 14.8% of the rounds. The vol1tllty of the BLOTTO program 
is responsible for the much greater gains than game theory. 
' . ~ .. J 
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Conclusion 
Game theory provides a useful tool in evaluating 
situations strictly in terms of enemy capabilities. However 
it is not adequate to accurately model many applications. 
Enemy intention schemes such as Bayesian decision theory 
provide much better results but with much higher risks and 
the potential for disaster. In the Colonel Blotto problem, 
a game theoretic approach yielded significantly lower 
results than the Bayesian BLOTTO program. However the 
usefulness of slightly more accurate information is not 
always beneficial and due to some problem dependent 
formulations may actually cause a significantly lower score. 
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Appendix 
Average Percentage of Outcome 
Spy Ratings Score -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8081 8.9 3.3 31.0 22.3 24.4 9.9 0.3 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8166 8.5 2.4 31.8 23.9 22.7 10.6 0.0 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8312 9.9 5.5 25.0 25.3 19.8 14.5 0.0 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.8423 8.8 5.2 26.7 24.0 23.4 11.3 0.6 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8459 9.6 4.5 27.8 21.2 24.4 12.0 0.5 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8476 8.9 7.8 23.4 23.0 23.6 12.7 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8493 9.0 5.7 26.5 23.0 22.4 12.7 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8600 8.9 3.0 27.5 25.2 24.9 10.6 0.0 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8771 8.8 4.5 27.4 22.4 24.0 12.5 0.5 
0. 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8806 7.7 4.1 29.4 22.5 24.2 12.1 0. 1 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8872 8.3 5.6 25.5 24.2 22.7 13.6 0. 1 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9044 7.9 4.7 26.5 25.1 22.1 13.5 0.3 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.9058 8.5 5.6 24.5 24.2 23.3 13. 1 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9075 7.0 3.3 29.3 23.8 25.5 11.0 0.0 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9150 8. 1 5.1 26.8 22.2 23.8 13.1 0.9 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9516 8.5 4.4 23.7 25.7 22.0 15.6 0.0 
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9548 7.4 4.2 25.8 24.5 24.7 13.2 0.2 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9571 7. 1 5.0 26.2 23.9 23.0 13.8 0.9 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9588 7. 1 3.3 28.1 23.4 24.7 13.5 0.0 
0. 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9597 ~--·· 5. 3 5.7 26.6 26.3 22.5 13.5 0.1 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9670 8.3 4.8 23.9 24.0 23.5 14.6 0.9 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.9715 7.3 6.6 22.9 24.2 23.5 14.6 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9722 7.0 7.3 23.7 23.1 22.7 14.9 1. 3 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9809 6.6 5.0 25.4 25.4 22.3 15. 1 0.2 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9842 7.3 5.8 23.4 24.3 24.2 14.1 1. 0 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9850 6.0 7.5 23.0 26.5 20.8 14.9 1.2 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9866 5.8 6.8 24.5 25.1 21.9 15.4 0.5 
0.1 0. 1 0.2 0.3 On9868 5.9 7.5 23.6 24.6 22.4 14.9 1.0 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9920 7.2 2.9 25.8 24.5 26.8 12.8 0.0 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9939 6.4 7.2 21.4 25.8 24.5 14.2 0.5 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9981 7. 1 4.7 22.3 27.8 23.5 14.5 0. 1 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9996 6.3 5.7 25.1 24.1 22.6 15.8 0.4 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0022 7. 1 4.0 25.4 24.2 24.8 13.9 0.8 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0033 7.8 2.9 25.9 24.0 23.3 15.8 0.2 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0097 8.0 3.3 24.4 22.1 28.6 12.9 0.5 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0131 8.2 5.5 21.6 23.8 24.3 15.2 1. 2 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0373 6.6 4.7 25.6 22.9 23.4 15.9 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0406 5.2 6.5 23.1 26.7 22.1 15.9 0.6 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.0501 5.7 6.2 22.2 26.2 24.0 14.5 1. 2 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0525 10.Q 4.9 20.1 20.1 25.1 19.9 0.0 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.0529 6.9 3.7 23.5 25.9 23.5 16.5 0. 1 0.1 0.3··0.3 o.5 1.0615 6.9 4.6 23.3 24.5 23.0 16.3 1.3 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0615 7.0 3.4 25.4 22.4 24.6 17.1 0.2 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0791 6.3 6.2 23.9 21.7 22.6 17.4 1. 9 
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 180794 6.3 2.7 24.6 24.9 25.7 15.6 0.0 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0924 4.7 6.3 22.9 25.9 22.2 17.5 0.5 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0985 10.0 0.0 30.0 10.1 30.0 19.9 0.0 
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Spy Ratings 
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 
O~O 0.3 0.4 0.4 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 
0.1 0. 1 0.2 0.4 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 
0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 
0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 
0.0 0.3 0.4 0.5 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 
0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 2 0. 5 
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Average 
Score 
1.0997 
1. 1074 
1.1218 
1. 1228 
1.1259 
1.1298 
1.1306 
1.1314 
1.1329 
1.1360 
1.1374 
1.1417 
1.1432 
1.1442 
1.1451 
1.1489 
1.1496 
1.1650 
1. 1702 
1.1723 
1.1812 
1.1833 
1.1844 
1.1854 
1. 1877 
1.2020 
1.2034 
1.2040 
1.2122 
1.2156 
1.2158 
1.2224 
1.2227 
1.2239 
1.2240 
1.2329 
1.2395 
1.2403 
1.2408 
1.2412 
1.2430 
1.2464 
1.2476 
1.2510 
1.2571 
1.2641 
1.2726 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 o 1 2 3 4 
6.3 5.6 22.3 22.6 25.4 16.5 1.3 
7.2 3.7 21.3 23.5 27.9 16.2 0.2 
6.5 6.6 21.3 20.7 26.5 16.1 2.4 
5.4 5.9 22.5 22.9 25.4 16.8 1.2 
5. 1 3.9 23.1 25.5 26.5 15.3 0.6 
5.0 5.9 23.6 23.5 22.2 17.9 1. 9 
4.8 5.2 21.9 26~2 24.7 16.6 0.6 
6.2 6.3 18.9 26.1 23.0 18.4 1.2 
6.3 3.3 23.1 23.7 25.9 16.8 0.9 
6.2 5.8 20.2 24.1 24.9 17.0 1.7 
4.0 4.7 21.8 28.8 24.6 16.2 0.0 
7.5 5.0 17.5 25.0 25.8 19.2 0.0 
5.9 5.7 20.4 23.8 25.6 17.2 1. 4 
5.8 6.2 20.2 25.4 22.3 18.7 1.5 
6. 1 6.0 19.2 25.1 24.1 18.4 1. 1 
6.7 3.0 22.6 23.2 26.6 17. 1 0.9 
5.4 5.1 21.4 25.1 24.9 16.8 1. 4 
5.8 4.9 20.7 25.0 23.8 19.1 0.8 
6.2 4.4 21.4 24.9 21.8 20.0 1.3 
6.5 5.0 21. 1 22.5 23.9 19.7 1.5 
6.4 2.4 22.4 23.7 26. 1 18.5 0.5 
6.2 4.2 20.8 23.6 25.6 18.5 1. 1 
2.3 6.8 21.7 27.2 24.2 16.9 0.9 
. 
6.0 2.5 21.9 26.3 23.4 19.7 0.3 
6.2 3.1 22.3 22.3 27.1 18.3 0.7 
10.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 29.9 20. 1 0.0 
6.2 4.6 19.9 22.3 28.1 16.8 2. 1 ,,_ )14. 8 0.0 15. 1 15.2 30.0 24.9 0.0 
5.7 6.0 18.9 24.3 22.4 21.0 1.7 
5.4 7. 1 18.8 21.3 26.5 18.5 2.4 
2.6 5.9 21. 1 27.7 24.4 17.4 1.0 
5.2 5.9 18.4 24.4 25.9 18.7 1.5 
5.2 5.6 17.9 25.5 25.3 19.4 1. 0 
4.0 7.5 18.4 24.2 25.4 18.9 1.5 
4.3 5.9 18.6 25.0 27.8 16.8 1.5 
3.9 6.2 20.3 23.9 25.2 19.3 1.3 
5.5 4.6 21.9 21.0 24.1 21.5 1.5 
6. 1 3.6 16.7 24.6 31.7 17.3 0.0 
5.8 4.7 18.3 23.8 26.3 20.4 0.7 
4.5 6.5 18.2 24.9 25.4 18. 1 2.4 
6.5 3.0 19.5 22.9 27.6 20.0 0.5 
4.5 6.6 19.4 22.7 25.2 19.4 2.2 
" 6. 1 5.3 17.4 23.5 26.6 18.8 2.3 
5.0 5.0 24.9 15.0 25.1 25.0 0.0 
4.9 4.6 21.3 21.7 25.7 19.9 1. 8 
2.9 6.3 18.6 26.7 25.9 18.4 1.1 
5.0 5. 1 20.2 22.0 25.0 20.4 2.3 
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Spy Ratings 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 
,Q ,0 2 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 6 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
0 . 0 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 .. 5 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0. 6 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.4 0.4 0.6 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Average 
Score 
1.2746 
1.2761 
1.2789 
1.2796 
1.2817 
1.2824 
1.2826 
1.2859 
1.2876 
1.2975 
1.3021 
1.3030 
1.3044 
1.3067 
1.3096 
1.3099 
1. 3116 
1.3151 
1.3200 
1.3238 
1.3250 
1.3256 
1.3278 
1.3279 
1.3308 
1.3336 
1.3336 
1.3375 
1.3448 
1.3455 
1.3497 
1.3502 
1.3562 
1.3571 
1.3573 
1.3621 
1.3630 
1.3658 
1.3664 
1.3666 
1.3687 
1.3709 
1.3712 
1.3743 
1.3744 
1.3760 
1.3826 
p· 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
5.2 5. 1 18.4 25.0 22.8 21.9 1. 7 
5.7 6.3 18.1 20.1 26.0 21.7 2. 1 
5.3 5.9 17.4 21.7 27.5 20.9 1. 3 
5.0 6.4 17.6 21.9 26.9 20.2 2.0 
2.7 6.0 20.4 25.1 24.3 19.6 1. 8 
4.8 2.5 19.7 25.1 28.1 19.7 0.0 
5.4 5.0 18.6 23.8 22.9 22.7 1. 6 
5.7 4.2 19.2 22.0 25.9 21.8 1. 2 
4.0 4.1 20.8 24.0 25.8 19.9 1. 4 
5.6 4.7 16.6 24.2 27.1 20.0 1. 8 
3.8 7.5 18.4 22.8 23.0 21.2 3.3 
3.2 6.3 18.8 25.0 23.9 21.0 1. 8 
1.9 6.7 18.3 27.3 25.5 18.8 1. 5 
3.2 5.6 18.3 25.8 26.1 19. 1 1. 9., 
4.8 5.2 17.5 24.1 25.1 21.5 1. 8 
4.6 5.7 18.6 23.4 24.1 19.9 3.7 
3.6 5.3 18.1 25.0 26.6 20.3 1. 1 
5. 1 4.4 17.5 24.3 26.1 20.9 1. 7 
2.5 3. 1 21.4 26.7 26.4 19.0 0.9 
6.2 2.5 17.5 23.2 28.7 21.4 0.6 
3.6 2.8 22.3 26.2 20.0 24.2 1. 0 
2.5 4.8 18.6 27.3 25.7 20.3 0.7 
5.6 3.7 17.9 22.9 26.1 22.9 1. 0 
4.6 7.3 15.3 24.0 23.8 22. 1 2.9 
3.9 3.9 15.8 27.9 29.0 19.5 0.0 
4. 1 6. 1 19.1 21.5 23.6 23.4 2.2 
5.3 5.0 17.5 21.9 26.7 20.6 3.0 
4.9 4.7 18.9 21.9 25.2 22.1 2.4 
3.6 5.8 17.8 24.5 23.8 22.7 1. 8 
3.5 6.0 16.8 24.9 25.8 20.8 2.2 
4.6 4.2 18.7 23.0 25.8 21.3 2.5 
5.0 5.8 16.9 21.4 26.1 22.0 2.8 
4. 1 5.9 16.7 24.0 25.5 20.8 3.0 
2.6 5.3 18.4 25.5 26.0 20.2 2.1 
5.6 3.0 16.4 24.0 27.1 23.6 0.2 
2.0 6.0 17.4 26.9 25.5 20.5 1. 7 
3.9 3.9 18.1 26.2 24.0 22.1 1. 9 
3.5 4.0 19.1 25.4 23.7 22.1 2.1 
5.5 4. 1 17.5 21.4 25.8 24.3 1. 5 
2.3 3.0 16.8 30.6 28.9 17.9 0.5 
4.7 4.8 14.1 25.7 27.0 23.1 0.5 
4.1 5. 1 17.2 24.0 25.9 20.4 3.4 
6.3 4.3 15.1 22.2 26.8 23.1 2.2 
4.8 3.7 17.6 25.0 23.0 24.1 1. 9 
5.3 5.0 15.2 22.9 26.3 23.3 2.0 
6. 1 4.4 16.0 21.1 26.5 23.4 2.5 
4.2 3.3 14.1 29.1 26.7 22.5 0.0 
35 
Spy Ratings 
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
o.o o.3 o.4 ·o.6 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 
0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.7 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.6 
Average 
Score 
1.3858 
1.3906 
1.3918 
1.4001 
1.4050 
1.4052 
1.4097 
1.4124 
1.4250 
1.4316 
1.4335 
1.4344 
1.4362 
1.4383 
1.4405 
1.4484 
1.4558 
1.4559 
1.4580 
1.4624 
1.4629 
1.4639 
1.4668 
1.4675 
1.4678 
1.4717 
1.4725 
1.4731 
1.4752 
1.4753 
1.4779 
1.4798 
1.4813 
1.4815 
1.4827 
1.4851 
1.4852 
1.4865 
1.4968 
1.4975 
1.4989 
1.5002 
1.5061 
1.5104 
1. 5110 
1.5124 
1.5128 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
4.5 3.9 16.1 24.2 26.9 23.8 0.5 
3.5 6.7 15.8 22.8 27.4 20.0 3.8 
4.0 5.4 17.7 22.4 23.8 24.1 2.6 
15.0 5.0 15.0 5 . 1 20. 0 30. 0 10.0 
5.2 6.6 14.2 21.3 25.7 23.0 4.0 
2.8 4.4 19.3 25.3 22.1 23.4 2.7 
3.3 4.2 20.0 20.8 27.5 20.9 3.3 
4.9 4.3 16.2 22.5 25.7 24.2 2.2 
4.2 6.7 15.0 22.5 23.3 25.0 3.3 
5.2 3.3 15.3 22.6 27.8 24.4 1. 4 
4.2 3.8 15.0 26.6 23.5 26.2 0.8 
2.5 4.9 15.3 26.9 27.0 21.3 2.2 
3.7 4. 1 16.6 25.1 24.4 22.9 3. 1 
4.3 4.7 15.5 23.0 25.8 24.4 2.3 
4. 1 2.7 16.0 23.6 29.5 24.1 0.0 
1. 0 4.2 17.4 27.2 28.3 20.4 1.6 
2.6 5.7 17.4 22.6 25.0 22.6 4.0 
31. 1 3.1 16.9 25.6 26.9 21.9 2.5 
4.2 5.9 15.8 20.9 25.4 23.5 4.5 
4.3 4.9 15.0 21.5 27.5 23.8 2.9 
4. 1 4.0 17.6 21.4 24.5 25.8 2.7 
3.6 3.8 14.7 26.9 25.0 23.3 2.6 
4.0 3.5 16.0 23.3 27.1 23.9 2.2 
4.5 4.3 15.1 21.7 27.0 25.7 1. 8 
4.9 3.8 15.9 20.8 26.7 25.3 2.5 
2.3 4.8 17.8 23.2 25.6 22.9 3.4 
3.3 5.0 14.4 24.1 27.7 22.4 3.0 
0.7 4.3 16.8 28.1 27.3 21.0 1. 9 
3.7 4.9 15.3 23.5 24.1 26.0 2.5 
4.9 3.6 14.5 22.2 28.0 24.6 2.2 
2.5 3.2 13.7 27.9 30.5 21.6 0.5 
4.2 3.7 15.2 21.9 28.2 25.1 1.6 
4.4 3. 1 15.8 22.8 26.7 25.2 2.0 
3.6 3.7 15.0 23.3 28.5 24.9 1. 0 
3.9 4.9 14.8 21.4 27.3 26.2 1. 6 
2.8 3.6 17.1 25.6 22.8 25.6 2.4 
3.7 4.6 14.3 23.9 26.0 25.0 2.4 
3.7 5.0 15.0 23.6 24.0 25.7 3.0 
3.0 6.2 14.0 23.4 24.7 25.0 3.5 
3.5 4. 1 14.4 25.4 25.0 25.1 2.5 
3.0 5.5 13.7 25.1 25. 1 24.7 2.9 
3.9 5.7 15.4 21.2 22.4 28.6 2.9 
4. 4· 3.6 15.3 19.7 30. 1 24.1 2.7 
2. 1 2.0 14.5 28.2 32.0 20.5 0.9 
0.0 4.9 19.6 24.9 20.4 30.0 0.0 
4.5 3.8 13.5 22.9 27.0 26.3 2.1 
2.8 5.1 15.6 21.8 27.3 23.8 3.6 
36 
Spy Ratings 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 
0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 6 0. 6 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 1 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.7 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.5 0.6 
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.7 
0.0 0.4 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 
0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
,, 
I 
Percentage of Outcome Average 
Score -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1.5150 6.0 3.5 14.0 21.0 21.0 34.0 
1.5209 3.4 4.7 13.3 25.2 24.8 25.7 
1.5234 2.6 5.9 13.9 22.8 27.1 24.4 
1.5242 4.0 5.4 14.3 20.0 26.5 26.2 
1.5255 3.0 2.5 15.2 27.1 23.7 28.1 
1.5263 2.7 4.2 15.5 24.9 24.0 25.1 
1.5295 3.3 5. 1 13.4 21.1 28.8 27.2 
1.5327 3.5 3.3 14.4 24.6 25.7 26.8 
1.5345 2.8 4.7 15.2 23.5 23.9 26.6 
1.5349 3.6 4.2 14.3 23.1 25.6 26.0 
1.5358 2.0 5. 1 14.0 25.1 27.1 24.1 
1.5370 5. 1 3.7 13.3 19.4 30.3 25.8 
1.5396 3.6 3.6 13.3 25.8 25.1 25.7 
1.5410 3.5 3.5 12.4 24.0 30.0 25.5 
1.5418 3.3 3.8 14.1 24.1 26.4 25.6 
1.5434 4.6 5.2 13.6 21.0 22.9 28.6 
1.5459 3.5 3.5 14.7 23.1 26.3 26.4 
1.5475 4.3 2.9 15.7 19.8 29.0 25.1 
1.5482 3.8 4.9 13.9 19.9 28.0 26.3 
1.5484 3.4 4.4 14.3 23.2 24.6 26.3 
1.5498 1. 9 2. 1 12.4 30.2 30.9 21.1 
1.5505 3. 1 5.4 13.4 22.0 26.1 27.1 
1.5510 0.0 0.0 24.9 25.0 20.1 30.0 
1.5550 4. 1 2.9 14.0 22.6 27.5 26.9 
1.5551 2.6 5.5 14.7 21.9 25.6 25.6 
1.5579 3.9 4. 1 13. 1 22.3 26.9 27.1 
1.5581 1. 9 6.6 14.6 21.5 26.3 24.5 
1.55S5 3.4 5.4 14.5 21.2 23.4 28.4 
1.5629 4. 1 3.9 13.8 21.5 25.5 28.9 
1.5701 3.0 4. 1 15.0 22.3 25.3 26.8 
1.5714 3.5 5.5 13.8 20.2 25.4 27.8 
1.5719 4.5 3.9 12.9 22.2 24.6 28.3 
1.5755 4.4 4.2 13.9 19.1 27.8 26.5 
1.5767 3.5 4.8 13.7 22.2 23.8 28.0 
1.5799 3.4 4.7 12.7 22.1 26.3 28.8 
1.5810 2.6 5.5 13.3 22.0 26.0 27.7 
1.5825 3.8 6.2 10.0 18.7 31.9 28.1 
1.5875 5.5 1. 1 12.4 23.3 28.3 26.6 
1.5890 3.5 4.3 13.9 21.1 25.8 28.1 
1.5900 3.9 2.8 13.3 18.9 33.4 27.3 
1.5915 4.4 3.1 11.8 24.1 25.6 28.5 
1.5920 . 3. 2 1.9 14.2 25.4 26.7 25.8 
1.5920 3.3 4.6 14.5 20.4 25.2 28.2 
1.5935 2.8 4. 1 14.1 23.7 23.9 27.8 
1.5958 3.3 2.9 15.3 23.4 22.7 29.4 
1.5967 3.0 2.5 15.1 25.6 22.4 28.0 
1.5970 1.5 .6. 5 12.3 22.7 25.1 32.0 
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4 
0.5 
2.9 
3.·3 
3.6 
0.6 
3.5 
1.1 
1.8 
3.2 
3.2 
2.8 
2.5 
2.9 
1. 0 
2.7 
4.0 
2.6 
3.3 
3. 1 
3.7 
1.4 
2.8 
0.0 
2. 1 
4. 1 
2.6 
4.7 
3.7 
2.2 
3.4 
3.8 
3.4 
4. 1 
3.9 
2.1 
3.0 
1.3 
2.8 
3.3 
0.5 
2.5 
2.8 
3.8 
3.5 
3.0 
3.4 
0.0 
Spy Ratings 
0.0 0.2 0.6 0.6 
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 
O.·O 0.3 0.6 0.6 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 4 0. 7 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0.7 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
· 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8 
0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 
0.0 0. 1 0.6 0.6 
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 
0.1 0.1' 0.5 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 
0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 
0. 0 0. 1 0. 1 0. 7 
0.0 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 
0. 1 0.5 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.8 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 
Average 
Score 
1.5980 
1.6004 
1.6052 
1.6063 
1.6093 
1.6108 
1.6151 
1.6166 
1.6171 
1.6200 
1.6211 
1.6306 
1.6343 
1.6381 
1.6419 
1.6422 
1.6426 
1.6427 
1.6431 
1.6439 
1.6474 
1.6488 
1.6497 
1.6572 
1.6632 
1.6651 
1.6665 
1.6685 
1.6686 
1.6688 
1.6689 
1.6690 
1.6704 
1.6735 
1.6801 
1.6814 
1.6843 
1.6858 
1.6904 
1.6932 
1.6970 
1.6988 
1.6989 
1.6997 
1.7000 
1.7014 
1.7020 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
3.4 5.2 13.4 20.1 25.8 28.6 3.5 
2.8 5.5 12.8 22.0 25.4 27.5 4.0 
3.6 2.7 13.2 23.6 25.9 28.6 2.3 
3.6 4.0 13.9 21.6 24.0 29.3 3.6 
3.0 3.0 13.4 24.8 24.9 28.4 2.5 
2.8 5.0 13. 1 21.0 26.6 29.0 2.6 
3.0 4.8 13.4 21.0 25.3 29.0 3.4 
2.4 4.2 11.8 24.6 28.0 25.9 3.0 
2.6 3.5 13.3 25.6 23.0 29.0 2.9 
2.7 5.5 12.9 19.7 28.1 27.5 3.6 
2.8 2.5 14.8 24.2 24.1 29.1 2.6 
3.8 5.0 12.9 17.3 28.8 28.0 4.2 
2.2 5.0 12.8 21.9 27.2 27.4 3.6 
2.4 4.7 13.5 21.3 27.1 26.1 4.8 
1. 7 4.7 9.9 26.5 28.8 25.4 3.0 
2.6 3. 1 15. 1 23.4 22.2 29.8 3.9 
1. 5 3.6 14.2 25.6 22.8 29.4 2.9 
3.8 3.8 12.4 20.8 26.7 28.4 4. 1 
3.1 3.6 14.7 20.1 25.3 29.4 3.8 
2.5 5. 1 13.4 20.5 25.8 28.5 4.2 
4.5 3.8 11.4 19.2 28.8 28.3 4.0 
3.3 5.2 12.3 20.4 24.3 29.9 4.5 
2.9 3.5 12.2 23.9 25.2 29.2 3.1 
1. 7 3.2 13.8 25.5 23.5 29.2 3. 1 
3.5 3.0 13.4 19.7 27.9 29.5 3.1 
2.7 6.9 12.6 18.0 23. 1 32.2 4.5 
5. 1 0. 1 10.6 20.3 34.8 29.0 0.0 
3.1 2.6 12.3 23.9 25.4 29.7 3.0 
2.3 4. 1 11.9 22.7 27.7 28.3 3. 1 
2.7 3.2 12.4 24. 1 24.7 29.7 3.2 
2.9 4.5 11.7 21.6 26.8 28.2 4.4 
1. 8 5.6 13.2 20.8 24.9 29.5 4.2 
3.3 4.7 10.9 21.8 25.4 30.3 3.7 
2.4 3.9 11.7 24.6 24.3 29.4 3.6 
3.4 3.8 12.4 20.7 24.9 30.9 3.8 
2.5 4. 1 13.4 22.3 22.5 31.0 4. 2· 
3.4 3.9 11.4 20.2 28.6 28.8 3.8 
3.3 4.5 10.9 20.1 27.7 29.9 3.7 
1. 3 5. 1 12.1 22. 1 27.2 28.4 3.7 
3.3 4.4 12.0 20.5 24.3 30.8 4.7 
2.3 1. 9 12.6 26.3 24. 1 29.6 3.2 
2.2 3.6 12.3 23.6 24.6 29.8 3.9 
2. 1 3.3 14.1 22.0 24.3 29.6 4.5 
2.0 3.8 13.7 22.9 22.0 31.9 3.8 
2.6 3.9 10.7 20.8 29.1 31.8 1. 2 
2.2 3.4 12.7 21.1 28.1 29.2 3.2 
3.4 2.5 14.4 19.9 23.4 33.3 3.3 
38 
I 
( 
Spy Ratings 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.8 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.2 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7 
0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.8 
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.0 0.1 0.5 0.7 
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.6 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.5 0.7 
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 
0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.8 
0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.6 0.7 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 
0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 
Average 
Score 
1.7050 
1.7079 
1.7103 
1.7147 
1.7156 
1.7196 
1.7213 
1.7232 
1.7235 
1.7278 
1.7280 
1.7346 
1.7358 
1.7390 
1.7405 
1.7488 
1.7530 
1.7537 
1.7560 
1.7587 
1.7590 
1.7606 
1.7616 
1.7633 
1.7645 
1.7656 
1.7690 
1.7698 
1.7733 
1.7733 
1.7734 
1.7785 
1.7787 
1.7790 
1.7798 
1.7835 
1.7882 
1.7885 
1.7886 
1.7886 
1.7890 
1.7905 
1.7938 
1.7941 
1.7945 
1.7950 
1.7968 
-2 -1 
2.2 4.4 
0.6 1. 3 
3.0 2.9 
3.4 3.8 
3.3 4.8 
2.5 4.8 
2.3 3.2 
2.9 3.8 
3.2 3.3 
2.4 4.8 
2.3 3.1 
1. 4 4.9 
3.6 2.6 
2.7 2.5 
2.0 2.9 
2.9 3.2 
2.4 5. 1 
2.8 3.5 
2.4 0.9 
2.4 2.8 
1.7 4.2 
2.0 4.3 
2.3 4.6 
2.3 3.7 
3.6 4.2 
1.5 1. 9 
2. 1 4.7 
2.3 3.3 
2.2 4.2 
3.0 1.7 
1.4 1. 1 
1.6 3. 1 
2.6 3.3 
2.3 2.3 
2.7 3.3 
1.5 1. 7 
2.3 2.8 
3.4 4.0 
1.6 6.0 
2.0 2.9 
2.3 4.7 
1.5 4.2 
2.9 3.0 
2. 1 4.5 
3. 1. 2.5 
', 
0.0'~1.7 
2.8 3.0 
39 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
9.9 23.7 27.4 28.8 3.5 
9.0 32.2 31.1 23.8 1. 9 
13.3 19.4 27.6 29.6 4.2 
11.7 19.6 26.3 30.8 4.3 
10.7 20.5 24.8 31.0 5.0 
12.0 18.9 27.3 29.6 4.9 
13.9 22.0 22.1 32.1 4.3 
12.0 19.4 27.6 29.5 4.8 
11.8 18.7 30.2 27.9 4.9 
12.2 20.1 24.4 31.2 4.9 
12.5 22.7 24.7 30.4 4.3 
11 . 6 21 . 2 27 . 1 .29 . 3 _ 4 . 4 
12.2 19.8 25.2 33.2 3.3 
11.1 23.5 27.0 28.8 4.5 
11.8 24.2 24.6 30.7 3.8 
11.6 20.3 27.8 28.7 5.5 
10.8 18.3 24.9 36.8 1. 7 
12.0 19.8 25.3 32.7 4.0 
19.4 16.3 22.9 33.3 4.9 
12.0 21.5 25.1 32.6 3.5 
10.1 19.8 30.0 33.4 0.9 
11.2 20.4 27.6 29.1 5.3 
11.5 20.3 24.2 31.8 5.3 
12.4 20.6 23.8 32.6 4.7 
9.8 18.5 27.6 30.8 5.5 
12.1 26.0 24.3 29.3 4.7 
11.6 18.4 27.8 30.0 5.4 
10.8 22.9 25.1 30.6 4.9 
11.2 20.5 24.9 32.1 4.8 
10.2 23.2 27.0 31.4 3.4 
13.6 26.3 22.2 30.8 4.5 
12.2 23.1 23.7 31.3 4.9 
10.8 22.1 24.2 32.1 4.9 
10.6 22.8 27.1 31.9 3.0 
10.2 19.9 29.1 30.6 4.2 
13.0 24.6 23.6 31.1 4.4 
9.9 22.8 26.8 31.5 3.9 
9.1 20.0 23.3 37.6 2.5 
10.2 19.4 24.0 34.0, 4.7 
10.8 23.0 25.0 32.3 4.0 
10.7 20.7 22.1 34.4 5.0 
10.2 20.1 26.7 36.6 0.7 
12.0 19.0 24.5 34.4 4.3 
10.5 19.4 26.4 32.3 4.7 
11.4 18.8 27.8 31.9 4.5 
13.3 28.2 21.8 30.9 4.2 
10.4 19.8 28.1 31.5 4.4 
Spy Ratings 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.8 
0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.2 0.2 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.3 0.4 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.4 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.8 
0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 
0.1 0.4 0.7 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.1 0.4 0.4 0.9 
Average 
Score 
1.7973 
1.8010 
1.8015 
1.8030 
1.8035 
1.8060 
1.8063 
1.8094 
1.8125 
1.8141 
1.8160 
1.8189 
1.8193 
1.8200 
1.8206 
1.8252 
1.8266 
1.8294 
1.8314 
1.8316 
1.8350 
1.8352 
1.8356 
1.8384 
1.8415 
1.8420 
1. 8421 
1. 8432 
1.8442 
1. 8443 
1.8446 
1. 8453 
1. 8473 
1. 8487 
1. 8489 
1.8500 
1.8508 
1.8509 
1.8527 
1.8532 
1.8542 
1.8548 
1. 8549 
1.8586 
1.8598 
1.8634 
1.8636 
_...,., 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
1. 6 3.4 11.6 21.8 24.8 32.5 4.4 
2.5 3.4 10.8 19.4 27.7 31.4 4.9 
0.0 5.0 20.0 15. 1 15.0 40.0 5 .. o 
2.0 3.8 11.2 20.3 25.2 32.5 5.0 
1. 6 4.1 10.9 21. 1 25.6 31.3 5.3 
2.5 3.7 9.8 21.5 24.3 33.2 4.9 
1. 5 1.3 11.9 25.4 24.5 30.9 4.4 
1. 6 3.5 11.1 21.8 25.9 30.3 5.8 
3.6 2.2 9.8 17.8 30.0 32.9 3.5 
2.5 3.8 10.9 18.3 27. 1 32.1 5.3 
4.2 0.9 8.2 22.6 26.8 35.0 2.5 
2.0 2.6 10.8 22. 1 25.7 32.1 4.7 
2.5 3.6 12.3 17.2 25.4 33.2 5.8 
2.4 2.4 10.9 21.0 25.7 33.9 3.8 
1.1 2.4 13.1 23.1 22.3 33.1 4.9 
1. 7 4.0 11.0 20.9 23.8 33.6 5.2 
1. 8 3.2 11.6 20.2 24.9 33.2 5.0 
2.0 3.6 10.2 20.2 27.5 31.1 5.5 
3.2 2.3 8.2 23.2 23.6 36.8 2.7 
2.2 3.2 10.4 20.4 25.7 33.5 4.6 
2.1 2.8 11.6 19.3 29.2 27.2 7.8 
0.9 2.2 11.3 25.0 23. 1 33.7 3.8 
1.8 4.4 10.3 20.0 24.4 34.1 5.1 
1.7 3.4 10.2 21.4 24.9 34.1 4.3 
1. 4 3.5 9.4 23.6 22.0 37.1 2.9 
4.2 4. 1 7.5 16.8 25.9 38.3 3.4 
1.6 0.9 11.5 24.3 24.9 32.5 4.2 
1.0 1.0 12.0 25.9 23.4 32.6 4.2 
2. 1 3.0 10.6 19.7 27.7 30.9 5.9 
1.9 4.3 9.3 20.7 25.6 32.6 5.7 
0.8 3.4 7.3 24.9 30.0 29.7 3.9 
2. 1 3.2 11.6 18.3 25.8 34.1 4.9 
0.5 1.5 11.3 26.5 24.0 31.9 4.2 
2. 1 2.7 11.1 19.2 27.5 32.3 5. 1 
2.0 3.3 10.2 20.1 26.9 32.0 5.5 
2.3 2.1 7.0 24.8 27.3 33.7 2.9 
1.7 4.0 11.5 18.6 24.9 32.7 6.5 
1.7 3.2 9.9 22.4 24.1 33.6 5. 1 
2.2 4.0 10.6 18.4 25.6 32.8 6.5 
2.6 3.1 9.9 20.1 24.6 34.6 5. 1 
1.0 2.3 12.1 22.4 24.3 32.7 5.2 
2. 1 3.9 10.3 18.6 26.3 32.9 5.9 
2.9 3.3 10.7 18.0 24.7 35.0 5.6 
0.9 1.5 10.8 25.5 24.2 33.1 4.0 
0.5 2.5 11.0 24.9 23.6 32.5 5.0 
2.7 4ft 3 9. 1 17.8 26.5 33.3 6.3 
1. 2 2.7 10.3 23.4 24.3 33.3 4.9 
40 
Spy Ratings 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.7 0.7 
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 
0.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 7 0. 7 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 
0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.9 
0.0 0.1 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.5 0.5 0.8 
0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 
0.0 0.4 0.7 0.7 
o.o a.a 0.1 0.0 
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.1 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0.3 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.2 0.2 0.9 
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.4 0.9 
Average 
Score 
1.8636 
1.8640 
1.8663 
1.8745 
1.8755 
1.8770 
1.8785 
1.8790 
1.8827 
1.8878 
1.8884 
1.8886 
1.8900 
1.8947 
1.8952 
1.8953 
1.8967 
1.9001 
1.9007 
1.9032 
1.9041 
1.9042 
1.9045 
1.9046 
1.9066 
1.9097 
1.9101 
1. 9114 
1.9185 
1.9189 
1.9218 
1.9279 
1.9279 
1.9286 
1.9314 
1.9320 
1.9333 
1.9335 
1.9348 
1.9351 
1.9355 
1.9373 
1.9390 
1. 943~- ;,--, 
1.9442 
1.9466 
1.9471 
-2 -1 
1. 3 1. 3 
2.5 2.5 
2.3 3.3 
2.5 4.2 
1. 0 2.0 
2.5 2.5 
0.9 2.5 
1. 7 4.0 
1. 5 2.3 
1. 3 2.3 
1. 1 0.9 
1. 5 3.4 
2.5 2.5 
2.0 3.4 
2. 1 3.9 
2.3 2.9 
1. 3 5.8 
1. 6 2. 1 
2.3 4.0 
1. 2 3.5 
1. 6 3.2 
1. 8 3.5 
1. 3 2. 1 
2.4 3. 1 
1. 0 1.9 
2.0 2.9 
2.0 4.2 
1. 8 3.7 
2.5 3.5 
2.7 2.9 
1. 3 2.8 
1. 2 1.8 
1. 8 3.5 
1. 3 1.9 
1. 1 2.2 
2.5 1.7 
1. 6 4.0 
1. 3 1. 5 
0.6 2.5 
1. 6 3. 1 
2.3 3.4 
2. 1 3. 1 
0.9 1. 7 
1. 9 3.3 
2.4 2.7 
2.0 3. 1 
0.8 2.3 
41 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
10.8 24. 1 25.5 33.0 4.0 
9.2 17.4 30.0 36.6 1. 7 t"" 
10.7 17.5 28.6 30.8 6.9 
5.9 20.0 27.8 38.1 1. 7 
11.8 22.7 23.8 33.4 5.3 
10.1 17.4 28.3 34.9 4.2 
10.8 22.4 24. 1 36.0 3.4 
10.9 17.4 26.5 33.1 6.4 
9.7 21.4 27.5 32.9 4.6 
9.4 23.8 24.9 33.3 5.0 
11.2 23.4 25.6 33.9 3.9 
11.2 18.7 24.7 34.6 5.9 
9. 1 18.6 26.7 38.1 2.5 
9.2 20.7 23.6 35.2 5.9 
10.0 17.3 27.0 32.8 7.0 
10.7 18.0 25.4 34.5 6.2 
8. 1 19.3 23.0 37.1 5.4 
11.0 21.1 24.2 34.1 5.9 
10.3 17.2 23.4 36.9 6.0 
7.8 21.6 27.2 34.1 4.6 
8.7 21.6 24.5 35.6 4.8 
9.2 18.9 26.4 34.7 5.4 
11.1 21.0 24.7 34.4 5.4 
9.4 19.6 22.9 37.5 5. 1 
9.2 24.3 25.4 33.9 4.5 
10.2 18.8 24.8 35.4 5.8 
9.6 18.4 25.0 32.6 8.2 
9.7 18.0 26. 1 34.9 5.9 
10.4 16.5 24.2 36.1 6.8 
10.3 16.2 25.4 36.9 5.6 
8.5 21.2 27. 1 34.1 5.0 
9.3 23.3 24. 1 35.5 4.7 
10.0 17.0 27.3 33.5 6.9 
9.9 20.5 27.3 34.0 5. 1 
10.2 22.0 23.9 34.6 6.0 
8.4 21.7 23.3 38.3 4.2 
9.0 18.3 24.5 36.8 5.8 
9.0 22.6 26.1 35.3 4.2 
9.7 22.8 23.8 35.9 4.8 
9.7 19.1 24.3 36.5 5.7 
7.8 18.6 26.4 35.9 5.6 
9.5 17.4 26.6 34.8 6.5 
8.2 24.5 24.8 36.1 3.7 
7.7 20.1 25.2 36.1 5.7 
8. 1 18.8 26.1 36.8 5. 1 
9.4 18.1 25.8 34.5 7.2 
9.0 21.9 26.3 34.5 5. 1 
Spy Ratings 
0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0. 1 0.2 0.9 
0.0 0. 1 0.7 0.7 
0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.4 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 
o. 1 0.2 0.5 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0. 1 0.4 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.0 0. 1 0.3 0.9 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 4 0. 9 
0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 
0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 
0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 
0. 1 0.4 0.5 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8 
0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.7 0.8 
0. 1 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 
0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.9 
0.2 0.4 0.4 1.0 
0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 
0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0 
0.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 
0. 1 0.1 0.5 0.9 
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0. 1 0.4 0.6 0.9 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.3 0.5 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 
Average 
Score 
1.9491 
1.9500 
1.9505 
1.9519 
1.9566 
1.9575 
1.9587 
1.9601 
1.9610 
1.9625 
1.9713 
1.9735 
1.9748 
1.9774 
1.9788 
1.9795 
1.9800 
1.9826 
1.9835 
1.9839 
1.9850 
1.9857 
1.9861 
1.9900 
1.9901 
1.9905 
1.9916 
1.9939 
1.9939 
1.9940 
1.9953 
1.9958 
1.9981 
2.0009 
2.0010 
2.0013 
2.0034 
2.0103 
2.0110 
~0126 
2.0165 
2.0170 
2.0171 
2.0185 
2.0210 
2.0240 
2.0268 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
1. 5 2.5 10.3 20.2 22.4 37.3 5.9 
2.5 2.5 5.0 27.5 17.5 40.0 5.0 
2.1 4. 1 9.8 16.2 22.4 39.1 6.3 
1. 4 3.5 9. 1 19.6 23.4 37.0 6.0 
1. 0 1.7 10.0 21.8 25.1 34.6 5.9 
1. 7 5.0 8.4 16.8 23.2 39.1 5.9 
1. 0 2. 1 9.4 21.4 25.0 35.3 5.7 
1. 8 2.9 9.0 18.6 25.4 36.2 6. 1 
2.5 3.2 7.8 18.3 25.8 35.4 7.0 
2.7 2. 1 9.6 16.4 27.4 34.7 7. 1 
1. 3 2.2 8.8 20.8 25.0 36.5 5.4 
2.5 1.7 7.5 20.1 25.0 39.1 4.2 
2. 1 3.9 9.7 13.7 27.6 35.5 7.5 
1. 0 3. 1 9.4 19.0 25.3 35.8 6.5 
0.9 2.0 8.7 21.9 25.7 35.0 5.8 
1. 0 2.0 8.2 21.0 27.6 35.2 5. 1 
4.0 5.0 8.0 9.0 29.0 36.0 9.0 
0.8 2.4 7.4 22.1 26.6 35.8 4.9 
1.0 2.3 7.6 21.5 27.0 35.0 5.6 
1.8 2.5 10.0 17.5 24.7 36.7 6.9 
2.5 1. 7 9.2 18.3 24. 1 38.4 5.9 
1.0 2.7 9.5 19.5 24.0 37.0 6.2 
1.2 3.9 8.0 18.3 26.5 34.7 7.4 
0.0 0.7 9.5 25.5 24.4 34.5 5.5 
0.9 2.6 9.6 19.3 25.6 35.0 1.0 
0.0 1. 0 8.9 26.2 22.9 36.0 5.0 
0.8 1.7 9.0 22.0 25.7 34.7 6.3 
0.9 2.9 9.5 19.4 23.3 37.4 6.5 
1.6 3. 1 6.5 18.9 29.4 34.2 6.4 
0.7 4.2 8.6 19.4 20.6 41.4 5.0 
2.0 3.3 8. 1 17.4 24.3 38.5 6.4 
1.4 3.8 8.5 18.4 23.2 37.5 7·. 2 
2.0 3. 1 10.6 14.8 24.4 37.3 7.9 
0.3 0.0 9.8 25.2 23.5 36.2 5.0 
1.1 1. 1 8.3 21.4 26.7 36.7 4.6 
0.0 0.4 10. 1 24.8 23.9 35.4 5.5 
0.2 0.0 9.9 25.3 23.6 36.1 5.0 
0.0 0.0 9.3 26.1 24.0 35.6 5.0 
0.2 1. 1 9.4 23.7 24.5 34.8 6.3 
1.2 1. 9 7.3 21.2 25.8 37.6 5.0 
1.6 3.0 9.7 16.0 24.7 37.7 7.3 
0.9 4.2 11.0 11.7 24.1 44.9 3.3 
0.9 2.9 8. 1 19. 5 25 . ·7 35 . 9 7.0 
3.0 2.9 8. 1 13.0 27.1 40.0 5.9 
0.0 1. 2 8.4 24.6 24.5 35.3 5.9 
0.9 0.9 10.0 22.6 21.6 37.5 6.7 
1.5 3.7 9.2 15.3 25.0 36.7 8.5 
42 
Spy Ratings 
0. 0 0. 1 0. 1 0. 9 
-~ 0. 1 0.5 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.2 0.7 0.8 
0. 1 0. 5 0. 5 0. 9 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 
0.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.4 1.0 
0. 1 0.3 0.4 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 
0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0 
0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 
0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 
0. 1 0.3 0.3 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0.9 
0. 1 0.3 0.6 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 
0. 1 0.3 0.8 0.8 
0. 2 0 .·3 0. 7 0. 9 
0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0. 1 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0. 1 0.5 0.9 
0.1 0. 1 0.3 1.0 
0. 1 0.5 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 
0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8 
0. 1 0.2 0.6 0.9 
0. 1 0. 1 0.6 0.9 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.1 0.2 ·0.3 1.0 
0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 
0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.2 1.0 
0.1 0. 1 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.4 0.5 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 
Average 
Score 
2.0275 
2.0277 
2.0290 
2.0292 
2.0295 
2.0312 
2.0324 
2.0333 
2.0345 
2.0346 
2.0352 
2.0368 
2.0383 
2.0385 
2.0400 
2.0418 
2.0427 
2.0438 
2.0457 
2.0458 
2.0466 
2.0467 
2.0485 
2.0493 
2.0498 
2.0501 
2.0505 
2.0548 
2.0568 
2.0604 
2.0651 
2.0658 
2.0667 
2.0697 
2. 0701. 
2.0737 
2.0741 
2.0742 
2.0755 
2.0769 
2.0775 
2.0788 
2.0795 
2.0796 
2.0797 
2.0822 
2.0827 
-2 -1 
1. o 1. 5 
1. 5 2.8 
1. 8 3.6 
0.5 2.8 
1. 4 1. 9 
1. 2 5.5 
0.0 1. 2 
1. 2 3.5 
0.0 1. 5 
0.0 0.9 
0.8 1. 9 
1. 0 1. 2 
1. 6 2.7 
0.0 0.0 
1. 6 2.4 
0.0 0.6 
2.0 2.5 
0.0 0.7 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.9 2.1 
0.7 2.8 
2.0 2.9 
l.5 2.9 
1. 5 2.4 
0.0 0.0 
0.7 2.1 
1. 2 1. 6 
1. 5 3.4 
0.9 1. 6 
0.3 1. 0 
0.9 3.4 
0.3 0.9 
1.3 2. 1 
1. 5 2.3 
1. 4 2.5 
1. 0 2.2 
1. 2 2.9 
0.0 3.0 
0.0 0.0 
2.0 2. 1 
1.3 1. 6 
3.0 2.0 
0.0 0.0 
1. 0 2.9 
0.0 1. 2 
1.8 3.2 
43 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
7.9 21.1 26.4 36. 1 6.0 
8.9 17.4 25.6 35.3 8.6 
8.3 16.0 25.6 36.4 8.4 
9.9 18.0 24.8 36.7 7.3 
8.4 18.9 25.6 37.7 6. 1 
8.6 13.3 24.3 39.7 7.5 
8.9 23.7 23.5 36.9 5.7 
9.7 16.9 21.4 39.9 7.4 
9.3 22.2 24.5 36.3 6.2 
10.0 22.1 24.6 36.4 6.0 
8.5 19.3 26.9 36.9 5.8 
6.8 20.8 30.0 34.9 5.3 
7.8 17.8 24.9 38.3 6.8 
6.2 28.0 26.8 34.1 5.0 
6.7 20.6 22.6 40.3 5.8 
9.1 24.1 23.8 36.0 6.2 
7.5 16.8 26. 1 39.2 6.0 
9.4 22.7 25.0 35.7 6.4 
8.2 25.1 25.8 36.0 5.0 
8.9 24.1 25.5 36.5 5.0 
8.4 18.8 26.7 36.4 6.7 
8.6 18.4 25.0 37.3 7.2 
7. 1 15.8 26.7 39.3 6.2 
7.8 17.2 25.6 37.2 7.8 
7.0 18.9 25. 1 39.2 5.9 
8.3 25.1 24.7 36.8 5.0 
6.2 21.8 26.6 37.3 5.5 
8.0 19.4 25.3 38.6 5.9 
8.2 16.3 24.0 39.0 7.6 
7.2 20.2 26.2 38.6 5.2 
8.6 20.7 27.2 35.6 6.6 
7.4 18.4 24.2 37.9 7.8 
8.8 21.7 25.4 36.3 6.7 
8.7 18.0 23.8 38.6 7.6 
9.0 17.0 22.0 41.5 6.7 
7.6 16.4 26.5 38.9 6.6 
7.4 19.9 23.0 40.4 6. 1 
7.2 18.6 22. 1 42.0 6.0 
8.9 17.8 24.9 38.4 6.9 
7.6 24.6 25.2 37.6 5.0 
10.0 14.0 26. 1 35.9 10.0 
9.6 15.6 27.6 36. 1 8.2 
7.0 16.0 25. 1 38.0 9.0 
7.7 24.0 25.5 37.7 5.0 
8.6 16.4 24.8 38.3 8.0 
7.8 22.5 24.9 37.0 6.5 
6.7 15.0 28.1 36.9 8.3 
Spy Ratings 
0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.5 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 
0.5 0.6 0.7 .0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 
0.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 
0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 
0. 1 0.4 0.8 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.6 0.9 
0.3 0.5 0.5 1.0 
0.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0. 1 0.3 0.5 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 
0. 1 0.2 0.5 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 
0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 
0. 1 0.2 0.4 1.0 
0.0' 0.0 0.4 0.9 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 1. 0 
0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 
0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 
0. 1 0.1 0.2 1.0 
0. 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.7 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 
0. 0 0. 0 0. 1 0. 9 
0.4 0.5 0.5 1.0 
0.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 
·0.0 0.5 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 
0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.5 0.6 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.4 0.6 0.9 
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 
Average 
Score 
2.0830 
2.0862 
2.0874 
2.0879 
2.0885 
2.0889 
2.0895 
2.0895 
2.0913 
2.0936 
2.0943 
2.0946 
2.0954 
2.0990 
2.0990 
2.1019 
2.1025 
2.1026 
2. 1030 
2.1032 
2.1049 
2.1090 
2.1099 
2.1111 
2.1143 
2.1157 
2.1163 
2.1164 
2.1166 
2. 1270 
2.1292 
2. 1326 
2.1360 
2.1362 
2. 1367 
2. 1371 
2.1374 
2.1380 
2.1394 
2. 1430 
2.1440 
2.1452 
2.1454 
2.1515 
2.1516 
2.1531 
2.1532 
•-' 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
1. 5 2.8 6. 1 18.8 23.4 40.5 6.8 
1. 0 2.9 7.6 16.3 27.4 36.9 8.0 
0.0 1. 1 6.7 23.1 26.5 36.9 5.8 
0.0 0.0 7.9 23.7 25.3 38.2 5.0 
2.0 1. 0 9.1 13.2 31.9 35.1 7.8 
1. 4 2.3 8.4 14.5 27.6 39.2 6.7 
0.0 1. 0 10.0 19.1 25.9 37.0 7.0 
1. 6 1. 7 9.0 14.6 27.8 37.8 7.6 
1. 3 2.5 8.1 16.4 25.0 39.4 7.4 
1. 4 2·. 4 6.9 17.3 25.4 40.1 6.6 
1. 6 2.4 6. 1 17.5 26.1 40.0 6.3 
0.2 1. 2 8.5 20.4 25.4 37.4 6.9 
1.2 2.4 7.3 17.1 24.7 41.3 6.0 
0.0 0.9 8.2 22.0 24.1 38.5 6.3 
1. 0 2.0 8.8 17.0 24.0 40.3 7.0 
0.0 1. 0 7.5 22.0 25.4 37.6 6.4 
0.0 1. 2 7.4 22.2 24.7 38.1 6.4 
0.4 1.1 7.8 21.1 24.3 38.4 6.9 
0.0 0.0 8.6 21.9 25.2 39.3 5.0 
1.6 2.5 8.5 14.8 24.4 40.8 7.5 
0. 1 0.7 8.4 21.2 25.3 37.7 6.7 
0.2 1. 4 6.4 20.8 27.6 37.6 6.0 
0.2 0.0 7.0 22.7 26.7 38.4 5.0 
1.2 2.8 7.2 17.0 23.8 40.3 7.7 
1. 4 2.8 7.0 15.7 24.8 41.6 6.7 
0.0 0.0 7.2 22.9 26.0 38.9 5.0 
1.7 2.3 8.3 14.5 24.9 40.2 8. 1 
1.0 3.3 7.1 17. 1 23. 1 39.9 8.5 
1.5 2.3 8.6 13.9 26.5 39.1 8. 1 
1. 1 1. 5 6.9 18.4 24.9 40.5 6.7 
1.6 2.9 7.2 14.5 25.1 40.5 8. 1 
0.5 0.9 5.4 21.5 27.5 37.9 6.3 
0.0 0.0 6.1 24.1 26.0 37.9 6.0 
1. 7 2.7 7.2 17.0 19.5 44.1 7.8 
1.4 2.3 8.2 14.8 25.4 38.8 9.2 
0.9 3. 1 8.5 13.0 26.4 39.·8 8.4 
0.0 1. 0 5.1 22.4 28.0 37.2 6.3 
3.4 0.0 9.4 12.7 23.4 43.3 7.8 
1. 1 3.0 8.5 13.7 25.3 39.2 9.3 
0.5 3.3 8.0 14.8 25.3 39.0 9.0 
0.0 2.6 10.9 14. 1 20.2 46.0 6.2 
0.5 0.8 6.8 21.0 24.5 39.4 7.0 
0.9 2.0 6.9 16.7 26.3 40.0 7.3 
0.2 1. 4 7.4 20.3 23.3 40.0 7.5 
0.7 2. 1 5.7 18.4 26.0 40.2 6.9 
1.2 2.7 5.8 15.4 28.3 38.6 8. 1 
0.9 2.0 6.0 18.7 23.4 41.9 7.0 
44 
Spy Ratings 
0.1 0.4 0.5 1.0 
0.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 
0.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.4 1.0 
0.1 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.3 0.4 0.6 1.0 
0.1 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 8 0. 8 
0.1 0.10.41.0 
0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.1 0.10.51.0 
0~0.10.21.0 
0.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 7 0. 9 
0.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.1 0.2 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 
0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0. 1 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.4 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.6 1.0 
0.1 0.1 0.7 0.8 
0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.7 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 
0.3 0.5 0.6 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.6 0.9 
Average 
Score 
2.1535 
2.1548 
2. 1550 
2.1556 
2.1566 
2. 1586 
2. 1618 
2.1647 
2.1651 
2. 1714 
2. 1730 
2. 1750 
2. 1771 
2. 1789 
2. 1795 
2. 1800 
2. 1821 
2.1825 
2. 1850 
2.1867 
2. 1878 
2. 1888 
2. 1897 
2. 1920 
2. 1925 
2. 1932 
2.1933 
2. 1940 
2.1959 
2. 1992 
2. 1993 
2. 1994 
2. 1995 
2.2000 
2.2000 
2.2027 
2.2080 
2.2088 
2.2105 
2.2143 
2.2158 
2.2200 
2.2224 
2.2244 
2.2255 
2.2259 
2.2265 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0.0 1.3· 7.1 20.0 25.3 39.2 7.1 
0.2 1.3 8.5 18.3 24.7 39.4 7.8 
1.0 2.3 6.4 17.2 24.9 39.9 8.3 
0.0 1.3 5.8 20.9 26.5 38.7 6.8 
0.6 3.0 8.7 16.1 19.8 42.4 9.2 
0.3 0.9 7.6 19.8 23.7 40.7 7.0 
0.8 2.7 8.3 16.0 21.1 41.9 9.2 
1.4 2.2 7.6 14.7 24.6 40.6 8.9 
0.0 1. 1 6.7 19.8 26.2 38.8 7.3 
0.9 2.7 7.4 15.8 21.3 43.6 8. 1 
0.6 1.2 5.8 19.8 24.6 41.5 6.6 
0.0 0.0 5.0 27.5 17.5 45.0 5.0 
0.0 1.5 8.2 17.6 24.5 39.5 8.6 
1.6 2.7 6.3 14.4 24.7 41.5 8.8 
0.2 1.2 6.3 20.1 24.3 41.3 6.7 
0.0 2.0 9.0 16.0 23.0 42.0 8.0 
1.1 2.5 8.2 13.4 24.8 40.6 9.5 
0.6 3.3 7.0 15.3 21.7 44. 1 7.9 
1.0 1.1 4.0 22.1 22.3 43.8 5.9 
0.0 1.1 5.1 19.9 28.5 38.8 6.6 
0.9 2.2 6.7 15.6 24.9 41.3 8.3 
1.0 2.1 7.3 15.6 23.1 42.4 8.5 
0.4 1.3 4.8 19.4 26.8 41.4 6.0 
1.3 2.9 8.4 13.4 19.9 44.6 9.4 
0.7 0.8 6.2 19.2 25.0 40.7 7.5 
1.1 2.8 6.8 14.1 24.7 41.4 9.1 
1.3 1.9 6.5 16.2 23.1 42.7 8.3 
0.9 2.2 6.8 16.3 23.3 41.2 9.2 
0.3 0.5 6.7 20.7 22.1 43.3 6.5 
0.9 3.3 6.6 14.1 23.2 43.0 8.8 
0.1 0.0 5.3 21.6 26.9 39.8 6.3 
0.0 0.4 5.9 21.0 25.9 39.9 7.0 
1.2 4.9 4.0 12.6 22.4 49.9 5.1 
0.0 1.0 10.2 12.8 29.8 36.2 10.0 
2.5 1.3 7.5 10.0 26.3 46.3 6.3 
0.3 0.7 5.3 19.9 27.4 39.1 7.4 
1.0 1.9 6.9 15.0 26.1 39.2 10.0 
1.2 2.6 6.4 13.8 24.5 43.0 8.5 
0.0 2.5 7.6 17.3 21.3 41.2 10. 1 
0.1 1.4 6.6 18.0 25.1 40.1 8.6 
0.6 3.0 6.7 15.9 19.5 46.2 8.1 
0.0 2.0 5.0 17.0 29.0 39.0 8.0 
1.3 2.0 5.7 14.9 25.1 42.8 8.4 
1.0 2.1 6.6 13.9 25.5 41.9 9.0 
1.1 2.6 10.3 10.9 19.2 45.4 10.5 
0.3 1.4 6.0 18.0 24.6 41.5 8.2 
0.9 0.0 6.5 18.6 25.7 39.3 9.2 
45 
Spy Ratings 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.1 1. 0 
0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 
0.2 0.4 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0.8 0.9 
0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.5 1.0 
' 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 , .... 
0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 
0.1 0.3 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.3 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 
0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.4 0.5 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.6 1.0 
0.1 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.6 1.0 
0.2 0.3 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.7 0.9 
0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.2 0.7 1.0 
0.1 0.2 0.8 0.9 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 
Average 
Score 
· 2. 2290 
2.2294 
2.2299 
2.2300 
2.2300 
2.2314 
2.2315 
2.2342 
2.2344 
2.2351 
2.2365 
2.2421 
2.2422 
2.2445 
2.2445 
2.2460 
2.2469 
2.2488 
2.2490 
2.2493 
2.2496 
2.2500 
2.2526 
2.2531 
2.2554 
2.2558 
2.2560 
2.2610 
2.2648 
2.2649 
2.2667 
2.2676 
2.2693 
2.2705 
2.2708 
2.2715 
2.2716 
2.2717 
2.2724 
2.2760 
2.2784 
2.2801 
2.2821 
2.2859 
2.2875 
2.2875 
2.2880 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0.0 0.0 4.0 22.0 25.1 44.9 4.0 
0.2 0.0 4.2 21.2 27.8 40.0 6.6 
1. 0 2.0 6. 1 14.2 24.7 44.0 7.8 
0.0 0.0 4.0 24.0 22.0 45.0 5.0 
1. 1 2.8 6.0 13.0 24.7 44.0 8.4 
0.9 2.0 7.8 12.7 25.4 41.5 9.7 
0.0 1. 0 4.0 22.0 23.0 44.0 6.0 
0.2 0.6 5.5 19.2 25.7 41.8 7.1 
0.3 1. 2 5.3 18.1 25.7 41.5 7.8 
0.3 0.8 4.4 20.0 25.7 42.0 6.9 
0.5 1. 8 6.3 16.2 24.1 42.3 8.9 
0.9 1. 9 4.7 16.6 24.1 44.4 7.5 
0.4 1. 3 5.3 18.2 24.9 41.3 8.6 .,.,_. 
0.0 0.5 6.7 16.6 28.9 38.3 8.9 
0.0 1. 6 5.5 17.5 27.2 38.6 9.6 
1. 0 4.9 5.0 11.0 22.1 47.9 8.2 
0.7 3.0 6.0 16.2 19.5 45.0 9.7 
0.0 1. 0 4.2 19.7 26.8 40.6 1.1 
0.0 1. 0 5.0 18.0 27.1 41.9 1.0 
1. 1 1. 6 4.8 15.2 25.4 44.7 7. 1 
0.0 1. 1 5.3 18.9 25.9 40.4 8.5 
0.0 1. 0 5.9 18.1 24.1 44.0 1.0 
1. 8 2.7 7.0 10.9 22.9 43.9 10.8 
0.7 3.4 7.5 14.4 15.8 48.9 9.4 
0.0 0.5 6.3 18.7 23.6 43.6 7.4 
0.5 3.4 6.7 14.3 19.2 46.7 9.3 
0.5 0.0 6.7 16.7 26.6 41.2 8.3 
1. 0 1. 0 6.0 16.8 22.1 44.0 9.0 
0.9 2.1 5.9 14.1 23.8 44.0 9.2 
0.4 1. 3 4.5 17.7 25.6 42.4 8.2 
1. 3 2.5 5.5 13.4 23.6 43.7 10.1 
0.5 2.1 4.8 16.9 22.9 44.1 8.7 
1. 2 2.3 7.0 10.4 26.2 42.6 10.2 
0.8 1. 6 7.2 12.7 25.4 42.2 10. 1 
0.0 2.0 5.8 16.5 23.2 43.2 9.2 
0.0 2.2 4.5 17.3 24.9 42.2 8.9 
0.0 1. 6 7.0 15.3 24.8 40.6 10.5 
0.5 0.8 4.9 18.0 24.5 43.3 8.0 
1.0 2.4 6.3 13.4 23.8 42.2 11. 0 
1.3 0.0 10.0 7.5 28.8 45.0 7.5 
1.1 2.2 6.5 11.8 24.9 43.6 10.0 
1.0 2.0 6.8 11.5 25.8 42.8 10.1 \ 
0.2 0.9 4.3 19.1 23.3 44.5 7.5 
0.8 2.3 5.4 14.3 23.8 43.2 10.3 
2.5 0.0 6.3 13.8 22.5 45.0 10.0 
2.5 0.0 7.5 8.8 28.7 42.5 10.0 
0.0 1. 1 5.6 16.7 24.4 44.5 7.8 
46 
Spy Ratings 
0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 6 1. 0 
0.0 0.2 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 
0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.5 0.6 1.0 
0.1 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0.1 0.3 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 
0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 8 0. 9 
0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.1 0.2 0.7 1.0 
0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.9 
0.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.4 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.6 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.7 1.-0 
0.3 0.3 0.9 0.9 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0.3 0.4 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.3 0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Average 
Score 
2.2895 
2.2921 
2.2942 
2.2962 
2.3000 
2.3005 
2.3026 
2.3027 
2.3030 
2.3032 
2.3066 
2.3101 
2.3153 
2.3172 
2.3183 
2.3196 
2.3203 
2.3220 
2.3247 
2.3260 
2.3275 
2.3313 
2.3372 
2.3375 
2.3383 
2.3387 
2.3395 
2.3426 
2.3427 
2.3460 
2.3462 
2.3468 
2.3474 
2.3500 
2.3524 
2.3550 
2.3557 
2.3595 
2.3607 
2.3620 
2.3625 
2.3633 
2.3655 
2.3669 
2.3670 
2.3680 
2.3683 
-2 -1 
0.9 1. 8 
0.4 0.8 
0.6 2.0 
0.9 2.4 
0.0 3.8 
1. 3 
~1. 3 
0.0 0.6 
0.6 3. 1 
0.8 2.2 
0.2 0.9 
0.0 0.6 
0.6 2.6 
0.5 3.0 
0.0 0.8 
0. 1 1. 1 
0.0 0.0 
0.3 0.4 
0.0 1. 1 
0.5 1.8 
0.0 5.3 
0.9 2.7 
0.9 2.7 
0.4 2.5 
0.0 3.8 
0. 1 1.0 
0.4 1.3 
0.0 0.0 
0.8 2.0 
0.6 2.6 
0. 1 1. 0 
0.7 2.6 
0.6 2.2 
0.0 1. 2 
0.0 1. 1 
0.8 1. 2 
0.7 1.5 
0.0 0.8 
1. 5 1. 0 
0.8 1.3 
0.0 1.7 
0.0 2.5 
0.8 0.9 
0.3 1. 6 
0.4 1. 0 
0.0 1.1 
0.0 2.4 
0.2 0.5 
47 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.9 16.0 22.4 45.0 9.2 
6.0 17.1 22.2 44.4 9. 1 
7.6 11.9 23.9 43.1 10.8 
6.2 12.2 23.0 45.8 9.5 
3.8 15.0 22.5 46.3 8.8 
8.7 7.5 23.9 51.1 6.3 
. 
6.6 16.7 23.6 42.9 9.6 
7.1 12.8 17.8 47.9 10.6 
5.4 14.0 24.3 41.8 11.5 
4.5 18. 1 23.6 44.5 8.2 
3.3 19. 0 26. 9 41. 8 8.3 
6.2 11.6 25.4 42.5 11.2 
6.3 12.6 19.6 48.2 9.8 
4.3 17.2 25.5 44.1 8. 1 
4.9 15. 5 27. 2 41. 7 9.5 
3.7 18. 0 28. 9 41. 5 7.9 
4. 1 18.1 24.3 45.0 7.8 
5.6 16. 1 23.4 44.9 8.9 
7.0 11.6 24.9 42.6 11.6 
4.5 11.8 20.2 46.5 11.6 
5.9 13.0 18.5 49.1 10.0 
5.9 14.4 15.7 50.0 10.4 
5.8 13.6 19.3 48.8 9.6 
5.0 16.3 15.0 48.8 11.3 
6.6 14.4 23.2 44.8 10.0 
5.2 14.8 23.9 43.9 10.4 
7.5 13.8 27.3 40.2 11.3 
5.0 12.7 23.5 46.2 9.9 
6.8 13.3 15.7 50.5 10.4 
6.0 15.2 21.7 47.2 8.9 
5.0 13.4 19.2 49.5 9.6 
5.5 12.7 22.6 45.3 11.1 
5. 1 15.5 25.0 42.2 11.0 
6.7 14.4 23.4 42.7 11.7 
3.6 15.6 22.4 48.1 8.3 
5.8 10.7 22.8 52.2 6.4 
6. 1 14.6 23.8 44.2 10.4 
5.4 11.4 23.9 46.6 10.2 
5.3 12.5 24.5 45.1 10.5 
7.7 11.2 23.9 43.4 12.2 
5.0 15~0 22.5 41.3 13.8 
6.2 12.4 24.3 43.5 11.8 
6.8 10.9 25.1 43.3 11. 9 
4.8 14.6 24.2 44.6 10.4 
7.6 14.8 15.7 51.5 9.3 
5.0 13.6 22.6 45.1 11.3 
4.2 16.9 22.6 46.8 8. 7 · 
17 
Spy Ratings 
0.1 0.3 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.1 0.6 1.0 
0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.6 0.7 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.7 1.0 
0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.5 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.6 0.7 1.0 
0.1 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0. 1 0.4 0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.4 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 
0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0. 1 0.2 0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.3 0.8 1.0 
0. 1 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 
0.1 0.6 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 
0. 1 0. 1 0. 9 0. 9 
0.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0. 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0. 1 0. 1 0.7 1.0 
0.4 0.7 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 
0.1 0.3 0.8 1.0 
0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.7 1.0 
0.3 0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.6 0.6 1.0 
0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 
Average 
Score 
2.3696 
2.3716 
2.3750 
2.3763 
2.3775 
2.3797 
2.3844 
2.3875 
2.3875 
2.3894 
2.3900 
2.3900 
2.3916 
2.3940 
2.3956 
2.4015 
2.4025 
2.4032 
2.4040 
2.4052 
2.4105 
2.4115 
2.4125 
2.4128 
2.4130 
2.4142 
2.4180 
2.4185 
2.4225 
2.4235 
2.4244 
2.4256 
2.4260 
2.4320 
2.4320 
2.4323 
2.4331 
2.4349 
2.4363 
2.4364 
2.4375 
2.4412 
2.4440 
2.4449 
2.4475 
-2 -1 
0.5 1. 5 
0. 1 1. 1 
0.0 3.8 
0.8 1. 9 
· 0. 0 1. 3 
0.5 3. 1 
0.0 1. 3 
0.0 2. 1 
1. 3 2.5 
0.8 1.9 
0.0 1. 1 
0.2 1.2 
0.7 1. 3 
0.5 1. 9 
0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.7 
0.0 2.6 
0.2 1. 6 
0.2 0.9 
0.3 1. 9 
0.4 1.8 
0.5 2.7 
0.0 0.0 
0.4 2.0 
0.0 1. 2 
0.6 1.5 
0.0 1. 1 
0.7 1. 0 
0.2 1. 0 
0.0 0. 1 
0.4 1. 4 
0.0 0.3 
0.2 0.7 
0.0 2.5 
3.4 1. 7 
0.3 0.6 
0.0 0.9 
0.9 1. 0 
0.0 1. 2 
0.0 1. 3 
0.0 3.8 
0.5 0.5 
1. 4 0.5 
0.9 1. 4 
0.0 2.5 
' 
48 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
7.2 11.0 23.4 43.8 12.6 
4.5 17.3 20.2 46.7 10.2 
3.8 12.5 22.5 46.3 11.3 
6.0 10.7 23.3 45.0 12.2 
7.4 13.8 18.5 47.8 11.3 
4.7 13.5 18.5 47.5 12.3 
5.2 14.2 22.8 45.7 10.7 
8.0 10.8 16.1 54.4 8.6 
6.3 11.3 16.4 49.9 12.5 
5. 1 10.4 25.0 45.2 11.6 
4.5 15.6 22.1 46.8 10.0 
6.0 13.5 22.8 44. 1 12.3 
5.8 11.7 23.4 44.9 12.2 
5.9 11.8 19.4 50.0 10.4 
4.6 12.8 23.6 47. 1 10.2 
4.4 14.7 23.8 46.3 10.0 
7.2 12. 8 12. 5 53;~9 10.8 
7. 1 9.2 24.8 44.4 12.6 
3. 1 15.3 24.6 46.6 9.4 
6.3 12.8 16.7 50.8 11. 1 
5.0 10.9 24.4 46.3 11.2 
5.6 11.2 16.9 52.3 10.8 
11.2 10. 1 15.1 53.8 9.9 
5.8 12.6 17.3 50.6 11.3 
4.0 17.4 17.3 50.0 10. 1 
6.0 10.2 24.3 44.3 13. 1 
7.8 10.1 21.8 47.4 11.8 
5.7 13.0 16.1 55.1 8.4 
4.8 13.0 23.9 45.8 11.3 
8.3 13.7 15.3 52.6 10. 1 
6.3 10.3 23.8 44.4 13.3 
4.0 15.8 21.7 48.1 9.8 
4.7 13.2 24.3 45.9 11.0 
2.6 12.6 24.9 46.2 11.2 
3.4 11.7 11.7 56.6 11.7 
3.0 14.1 24.2 49.0 8.7 
4.5 14.3 22.4 45.8 12.0 
4.8 10.4 24.4 47.2 11.3 
4.4 12.3 24.8 45.9 11.3 
5.2 11.7 23.8 45.9 12.0 
2.5 10.0 23.8 50.0 10.0 
3.3 13.4 24.3 47.9 10. 1 
8.6 8.0 16.7 52.4 12.3 
3.6 10.3 25.0 47.9 11.0 
6.3 7.4 22.6 50.0 11.2 
Spy Ratings 
0.1 0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.4 0.9·0.9 
0.1 0.6 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.7 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.6 0.6 0. 7 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 
0.1 0.10.81.0 
0.1 0.2 0.8 1.0 
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 
0.2 0.4 0.8 1.0 
0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.6 0. 7 1.0 
0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.0 0.10.71.0 
0.2 0.3 0.9 1.0 
0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.4 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.3 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.7 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.6 0. 7 1.0 
0.5 0.6 0. 7 1.0 
0.2 0.5 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.6 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.0 0. 7 1.0 
0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.3 0.9 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 
0.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 
\ 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 
0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Average 
Score 
2.4488 
2.4495 
2.4500 
2.4505 
2.4519 
2.4570 
2.4575 
2.4600 
2.4625 
2.4638 
2.4649 
2.4665 
2.4669 
2.4670 
2.4681 
2.4687 
2.4695 
2.4715 
2.4716 
2.4741 
2.4747 
2.4775 
2.4787 
2.4788 
2.4800 
2.4808 
2.4843 
2.4884 
2.4928 
2.4986 
2.4993 
2.5000 
2.5005 
2.5065 
2.5078 
2.5083 
2.5130 
2.5191 
2.5202 
2.5210 
2.5215 
2.5224 
2.5260 
2.5347 
2.5355 
2.5372 
2.5420 
-2 -1 
0.6 1. 2 
1.3 0.0 
0.0 2.5 
0.0 0.0 
0.3 1. 4 
0.4 1. 2 
0.3 1. 1 
0.0 3.0 
0.0 2.5 
0.8 1. 6 
0.6 1. 7 
0.0 3.7 
0.2 2.6 
0.0 0.0 
0.3 1. 1 
0.3 1. 0 
0.3 0.9 
0.7 0.7 
0.3 0.9 
0.5 1. 0 
0.3 0.8 
0.8 1. 8 
0.3 1. 1 
0. 1 0.5 
0.7 0.7 
0.3 1. 2 
0.0 0.8 
0.2 0.8 
0.2 1. 0 
0.2 1. 1 
0.5 1.3 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.5 0.5 
0.2 1. 4 
0.0 0.7 
1. 4 0.7 
0.3 2. 1 
0.2 0.4 
0.0 3.8 
0.0 0.0 
0.4 1. 7 
0.0 0.0 
0.3 1. 0 
0.0 1. 3 
0.0 1. 1 
1.3 0.0 
49 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.8 9.6 24.5 48.5 10.8 
6.3 7.5 26.2 47.5 11. 3 
2.5 13.8 25.0 41.3 15.0 
10.0 6.3 23.8 48.8 11.3 
5.7 9.5 25.6 43.7 13.8 
4.3 13.2 19.8 49.8 11. 4 
3.0 13.2 24.4 46.9 11.1 
4.0 8.0 24.0 51.0 10.0 
5.0 8.8 23.8 47.5 12.5 
4.9 8.4 25.1 45.6 13.5 
5.4 11.3 16.5 52.6 11.8 
1. 7 11.4 21.6 50.6 11.0 
4.7 12.4 14.9 53.0 12.1 
3.8 13.6 25.0 47.5 10.2 
3.3 12.1 24.9 46.6 11. 7 
5.6 10.6 23.2 46.1 13.3 
4.3 12.3 22.7 47.4 12.1 
7.2 8.6 19.1 52.2 11. 5 
3.7 11.7 24.8 47.4 11.3 
3.7 10.9 24.7 47.7 11. 6 
4.3 12.8 21.4 48.5 11.9 
0.3 2.6 4.6 71.9 18.0 
3.7 11.6 22.8 49.3 11.1 
5.6 11.7 22.6 46.2 13.3 
7.1 7.8 20.0 52.1 11.5 
5.8 8.8 24.1 46.6 13.2 
3.5 13.4 22.3 48.6 11.4 
4.4 12.3 22.0 47.4 12.9 
5.5 9.3 23.8 47.1 13.1 
5.0 11.7 18.1 52.4 11. 6 
4.5 9.0 24.1 48.0 12.8 
6.3 12.5 20.0 47.5 13.8 
5.0 11.3 26.1 43.9 13.8 
3.0 11.0 24.9 48.5 11. 4 
4.4 11.3 18.6 52.3 11. 8 
3.8 12. 1 22.1 49.5 11. 7 
4.5 11.3 15.7 53.5 12.8 
3.8 12. 1 15.5 53.4 12.8 
1. 4 13.5 23.9 51.0 9.7 
2.5 8.9 22.4 47.4 14.9 
6.0 10.4 20.0 52.6 11.0 
4.8 11.2 14.9 54.7 12.4 
5.0 8.8 23.7 53.8 8.8 
3.9 9.2 23.8 49.1 12.7 
5.0 12.6 16.4 49.9 15.0 
4.6 11.4 17.4 52.7 12.7 
2.5 11.2 23.6 47.9 13.7 
Spy Ratings 
0.3 0.4 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0. 1 0. 7 0. 7 1. 0 
0.4 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.3 0.9 1.0 
0.1 0.2 0.9 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.7 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.8 1.0 
0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 
0.1 0.6 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.1 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.7 0.7 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.1 0.4 0.9 1.0 
0.2 0.4 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.5 0.8 1.0 
0.5 0.5 0.8 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.4 0.9 1.0 
0.1 0.10.91.0 
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.3 1.0 1.0 
0.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.9 1.0 
0.3 0.7 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.1 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.2 0.5 0.9 1.0 
0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0. 
0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 
0.3 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.0 0.3 0.9 1.0 
Average 
Score 
2.5421 
2.5483 
2.5485 
2.5490 
2.5500 
2.5505 
2.5545 
2.5579 
2.5590 
2.5600 
2.5609 
2.5615 
2.5642 
2.5644 
2.5660 
2.5661 
2.5704 
2.5750 
2.5750 
2.5770 
2.5785 
2.5787 
2.5820 
2.5834 
2.5875 
2.5875 
2.5891 
2.5948 
2.5995 
2.6014 
2.6027 
2.6049 
2.6061 
2.6075 
2.6099 
2.6175 
2.6215 
2.6231 
2.6250 
2.6262 
2.6284 
2.6300 
2.6309 
2.6318 
2.6324 
2.6345 
2.6392 
-2 -1 
0.3 0.3 
0.4 1. 7 
0.2 1.1 
0.0 1. 4 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 1. 3 
0.0 0.7 
0.0 0.5 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.9 
0.4 1. 8 
0.2 0.4 
0.3 0.7 
0.0 0.0 
0.4 1. 3 
0.2 1. 5 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 3.8 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.7 
0.2 0.4 
0.2 0.5 
0.0 1. 3 
0.0 1. 7 
0.2 1. 2 
0.0 1. 0 
0.0 0.3 
0.3 1. 8 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.5 
0.2 0.6 
0.0 3.6 
0.0 0.0 
0.2 1.1 
0.0 2. 1 
0.0 0.6 
0.0 1.3 
0.2 0.1 
0. 1 1. 4 
0.0 0.0 
0.2 0.5 
0.0 1. 0 
0.0 0.5 
0.0 1. 3 
0.0 0.1 
50 
Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.1 10.6 24.4 49.6 11.7 
4.7 10.3 14.6 55.6 12.8 
4.3 11.2 17.0 53.5 12.7 
7.2 7. 1 16.4 54.9 12.9 
6.7 8.4 18.3 56.7 10.0 
5.0 7.4 23.8 48.8 13.8 
5. 1 8.4 24.5 46.9 14.5 
5.0 9.0 23.3 47.6 14.5 
5.0 12.3 17.2 52.3 13.2 
7.7 10.0 13.7 55.8 12.8 
3. 1 12. 1 18.8 52.7 12.4 
4.3 9.8 15.1 55.5 13.1 
4.8 9.6 22.3 47.8 14.9 
4.2 8.6 22.7 50.0 13.5 
5.5 8.6 22.0 51.6 12.3 
3.9 11.4 13.9 56.7 12.3 
4.5 7.4 23.5 47.4 15.6 
6.3 10.0 16.3 55.0 12.5 
2.5 6.3 23.8 47.5 16.3 
8.0 8.3 11.9 61.3 10.4 
7.5 6.6 17.9 56.5 11.5 
4.3 8.6 24.0 47.5 14.9 
2.9 10.0 23.2 50.6 12.7 
3.6 8.4 24.0 50.0 13.3 
2.5 8.8 26.3 46.3 15.0 
5.0 5.0 24.9 48.4 15.0 
4.9 6.5 22.6 49.5 15.0 
3.5 11.6 15.6 55.2 13.1 
5.1 8.3 16.9 59.3 10.1 
3.6 9.6 14.8 56.2 13.7 
4.2 9.6 21.9 50.4 13.9 
3.8 8.6 24.2 47.0 15.8 
4.2 8.3 21.8 49.8 15.1 
1. 3 8.6 18.9 52.5 15.1 
5.5 6.9 23.1 50.0 14.4 
4.6 9.8 12.8 58.0 13.5 
2.2 12.0 12.3 57.9 13. 5 · 
4.0 7.7 22.6 50.5 14.7 
2.5 10.0 18.8 53.8 13.8 
3.8 7.2 23.0L50.0 15.2 
3.7 9.0 16.1 55.7 14. 1 
6.5 9.0 13.0 58.0 13.5 
2.4 8.2 24.0 51.5 13.3 
3.5 10.0 15.7 56.0 13.7 
2.5 8.0 24.5 50.8 13.6 
2.6 12.5 12.4 57.5 13.7 
3.7 7.2 23.3 49.3 15.7 
-, 
Spy Ratings 
0.0 0.6 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.4 0.5 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 
0. 1 0. 7 0. 8 1. 0 
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.4 0.4 0.9 1.0 
0.2 0.4 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.5 0.9 1.0 
0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 
0.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 
" 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 
0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.3 0.5 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.3 1.0 1.0 
0.3 0.4 1.0 1.0 
0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 
0.1 0.4 1.0 1.0 
0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 
0.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 
0.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 
0.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 
0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 
0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 
0.5 0.5 0.9 1.0 
0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 
0.10.11.01.0 
0.3 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.6 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 
0.2 0.5 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 
0. 1 0.6 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 
0.3 0.5 1.0 1.0 
0.2 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 
0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 
Average 
Score 
2.6398 
2.6546 
2.6560 
2.6580 
2.6594 
2.6595 
2.6625 
2.6633 
2.6705 
2.6745 
2.6749 
2.6760 
2.6762 
2.6850 
2.6855 
2.6878 
2.6903 
2.6915 
2.6920 
2.6921 
2.6970 
2.6975 
2.6995 
2.7005 
2.7015 
2.7038 
2.7125 
2.7185 
2.7234 
2.7235 
2.7240 
2.7255 
2.7259 
2.7275 
2.7277 
2.7295 
2.7298 
2.7302 
2.7318 
2.7350 
2.7361 
2.7388 
2.7410 
2.7434 
2.7495 
2.7585 
2.7670 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0. o. 
0.0 
0.0 
1. 7 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
cr:·o 
<o. o 
o. o, 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1. 2 
1. 0 
0.0 
1. 0 
0.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.6 
0.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1. 6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
0.9 
1. 5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
0.3 
0.8 
0.0 
1. 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
51 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.8 9.2 13.0 59.2 13.3 
4.1 8.5 14.6 58.3 13.4 
3.3 6.7 24.5 52.1 13.4 
4.2 8.4 14.2 58.7 13.5 
2.9 10.7 14.2 58.6 13.0 
2.1 10.7 18.5 56.5 12.2 
3.0 6.9 23.8 53.1 13.1 
3.6 7.6 22.9 50.4 15.4 
3.5 5.1 23.9 52.3 14.5 
3.5 8.6 15.7 58.0 13.6 
4.2 5.9 22.9 52.1 14.9 
3.7 5.9 22.3 55.5 12.7 
3.6 7.9 21.2 52.0 15.3 
1.7 10.0 15. 1 54.9 16.7 
1.5 7.4 27.2 48.9 15.0 
3.0 8.4 11.5 61.5 13.7 
3.9 5.9 23.7 50.5 16.1 
2.9 6.1 23.9 53.1 14.0 
4.3 5.1 20.6 57.1 12.8 
3.3 7.0 23.8 49.2 16.7 
2.6 7.4 20.1 51.1 17.5 
2.9 9.3 12.0 60.8 13.9 
1.4 10.1 14.2 58.6 14.3 
3.8 7.5 18.7 55.0 15.0 
3.5 6.4 20.8 54.9 14.3 
3.1 8.9 13.8 58.8 14.6 
2. 1 9.3 17.1 57.9 13.5 
2.3 7.8 19.3 57. 1 13.6 
3.2 5.5 24.1 50.5 16.8 
2.7 5.5 24.9 50.4 16.4 
2.1 9.3 17.9 55.0 15.6 
3.7 3.8 23.8 53.8 15.0 
3.7 5.4 21.4 53.6 15.9 
3.7 8.7 11.3 63.8 12.5 
1.8 8.5 17.0 58.6 13.8 
2.9 4.7 22.8 52.0 16.9 
3.5 4.7 23.0 52.7 16.1 
2.4 5.8 23.0 53.9 14.9 
3.0 5.2 22.3 52.8 16.3 
2.4 7.3 22.3 50.3 17.6 
2.2 9.0 14.7 58.9 14.7 
3.0 8.5 11.6 61.2 14.9 
3.7 3.7 22.4 55.1 15.0 
3.2 7.8 10.8 62.6 14.5 
3.4 8.3 14.9 56.8 16.6 
2.9 7.1 17. 1 57.4 15.7 
3.4 9.9 8.5 63.2 15.0 
Spy Ratings 
0.6 0.8 0.8 1. 0 
0.4 0.8 0.8 1. 0 
0.1 0.5 1.0 1. 0 
0.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 
0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.6 0.9 1.0 
0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.3 0.7 0.9 1.0 
0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 
0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 
0.3 0.8 0.8 1.0 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
0.1 0.7 0.9 1.0 
0.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 
0.2 0.1 0.9 1.0 
0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 
0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 
0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.7 0.9 1. 0 
0.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 
0.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 
0.2 0.6 1.0 1. 0 
0.6 0.6 0.9 1. 0 
0.5 0.6 1.0 1. 0 
0.4 0.8 0.9 1. 0 
0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.6 0.6 1.0 1. 0 
0.1 0.8 0.9 1. 0 
0.4 0.6 1.0 1. 0 
0.1 0.6 1.0 1. 0 
0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.6 0.7 1.0 1. 0 
0.2 0.8 0.9 1. 0 
0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 
0.3 0.7 1.0 1. 0 
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Average 
Score 
2.7680 
2.7685 
2.7711 
2.7740 
2.7750 
2.7805 
2.7828 
2.7850 
2.7905 
2.7925 
2.7945 
2.7975 
2.8010 
2.8049 
2.8111 
2.8112 
2.8124 
2.8170 
2.8185 
2.8195 
2.8215 
2.8220 
2.8265 
2.8408 
2.8409 
2.8410 
2.8489 
2.8500 
2.8520 
2.8570 
2.8581 
2.8600 
2.8650 
2.8690 
2.8735 
2.8760 
2.8806 
2.8835 
2.8928 
2.8945 
2.9005 
2.9042 
2.9045 
2.9080 
2.9140 
2.9170 
2.9200 
• 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 8.4 66.6 15.0 
0.0 0.7 2.3 7.9 12.2 62.7 14.3 
0.0 0.0 2. 1 4.4 23.4 54.4 15.6 
0.1 0.8 2. 1 7. 1 13.3 61.4 15.2 
0.0 0.0 2.5 7.5 17.6 55.0 17.4 
0.5 0.0 3.0 7.4 11.1 62.5 15.5 
0.0 0.6 2.3 7.4 12.5 62.0 15.2 
0.0 0.8 2.3 8.8 8.8 64.3 14.9 
0.0 0.0 1. 8 8.7 14.1 59.6 15.9 
0.0 0.0 2.9 2.0 24.6 54.0 16.6 
0.0 0.2 7.7 2.5 8.·3 65. 0 16.4 
0.0 0. 1 3.4 6.7 11.8 62.5 15.6 
0.0 0.6 2.0 6.3 13.8 62.5 14.8 _.,, / 
0. 1 0.0 1. 2 9.0 11.7 63.1 14.8 
0.3 1. 1 3.0 4.8 10.6 64.0 16.3 
0.0 0.0 2.2 4.2 21.5 54.6 17.6 
0.0 0.6 1. 8 7.0 12.7 62.2 15.7 
0.0 0.0 1. 7 6.7 15.0 61.7 15.0 
0.0 0.0 1. 5 2.8 25.0 53.9 16.8 
0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3 9.9 58.5 18.4 
0.0 0.0 0.9 3.5 25.4 53.1 17. 1 
0.0 0.0 1. 8 5.5 17.4 59.5 15.9 
0.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 21.2 55.8 17.5 
0.0 0.4 2.5 6.5 10.2 64.3 16.2 
0.2 0.5 2.5 5.8 9.7 65.5 15.8 
0.0 0.0 1. 5 7.0 13.6 62.0 16. 1 
0.5 0.7 2.5 5.3 8.2 66.7 16.2 
0.0 0.0 2.5 7.0 11.0 62.0 17.5 
0.0 0.0 3.4 8.1 1.8 73.4 13.4 
0.0 0.0 2.2 7.1 9.9 64.4 16.4 
0.0 0.0 1. 4 5. 8 -14. 3 62. 7 15.8 
0.0 0.0 2.5 5.5 12.5 62.5 17.0 
0.0 0.0 0.5 6.5 15.5 61.0 16.5 
0.0 0.0 2.3 7.2 8.2 65.8 16.5 
0.0 0.0 1. 4 7.5 9.0 66.3 15.7 
0.0 0.0 2.3 3. 9 15. 1 61. 5 17.3 
0.0 0.4 1. 3 6.4 10.1 65.4 16.4 
0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 18.4 60.0 16.7 
0.0 0.0 1. 4 4.9 13.5 63.6 16.7 
0.0 0.0 -0.8 5.8 13.4 63.3 16.8 
0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 15.0 60.0 18.4 
0.0 0.4 1. 7 5. 1 9.6 66.2 17. 0. 
0.0 0.0 1. 5 5.5 11.1 65.0 17.0 
l 0.0 0.0 0.7 6.3 11.6 64.3 17. 1 
0.0 0.0 0.3 6.8 8.8 69.3 14.8 
0.0 0.0 3.3 3.3 6.9 71.5 15.0 
0.0 0.0 1. 6 5.0 5.1 76.5 11. 8 
52 
Spy Ratings 
0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 
0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.3 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.6 1.0 1.0 
0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.7 1.0 1.0 
0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 
0.4 0.7 1.0 1.0 
0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 
0.6 0.81.01.0 
0.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 
0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 
0.3 0.8 1.0 1.0 
0.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 
0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.9 0.9 1. 0 
0.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 
0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 
0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 
0.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 
0.2 0.9 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.9 1.0 1. 0 
0.9 0.9 1. 0 1. 0 
0.3 0.9 1. 0 1. 0 
0.4 0.9 1.0 1. 0 
0.7 0.9 0.9 1. 0 
0.7 0.9 1.0 1. 0 
0.7 0.8 1.0 1. 0 
0.8 0.9 1.0 1. 0 
0.6 0.9 1.0 1. 0 
0.5 0.9 1.0 1. 0 
r 
Average 
Score 
2.9320 
2.9330 
2.9335 
2.9390 
2.9400 
2.9422 
2.9485 
2.9515 
2.9589 
2.9620 
2.9634 
2.9635 
2.9670 
2.9725 
2.9735 
2.9775 
2.9815 
2.9820 
2.9826 
2.9830 
2.9845 
2.9895 
2.9957 
2.9965 
3.0005 
3.0105 
3.0185 
3.0230 
3.0365 
3.0383 
3.0390 
3.0410 
3.0825 
3.0920 
3.0940 
3. 1191 
3. 1274 
3. 1385 
3. 1390 
3. 1515 
3. 1570 
3. 1690 
3. 1785 
3. 1800 
3. 1880 
3. 1920 
3. 1955 
-2) -1 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.3 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 1.7 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.4 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.5 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
o:o 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
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Percentage of Outcome 
0 1 2 3 4 
0.0 8.4 6.7 68.3 16.7 
3.3 3.4 5.0 73.3 15.0 
0.0 8.3 6.6 68.3 16.7 
1.1 5.3 9.8 66.3 17.5 
1. 0 6.0 7.5 69.0 16.5 
1. 4 4.3 10.3 66.9 17.2 
1. 7 1. 7 13.3 66.6 16.7 
1. 6 5.0 7.5 68.5 17.4 
1. 3 4.4 8.8 68.2 17.3 
2.3 3.8 7.0 69.3 17.6 
0.9 3.9 10.7 67.4 17.3 
1. 2 4. 1 9.8 67.0 17.9 
0.0 6.7 8.3 66.7 18.4 
1. 1 1. 1 15.9 63.1 18.8 
1. 6 4.2 6.2 70.0 17.8 
0. 1 4.0 11.0 68.0 17.0 
0.0 5.1 10.1 66.6 18.3 
1. 7 1. 7 1.7 78.3 15.0 
0.8 4.9 7.0 69.8 17.4 
0.0 5.0 11.7 63.3 20.0 
0.0 5.0 10.0 66.7 18.4 
1. 5 3.5 6.5 71.5 17.0 
1. 5 3. 1 5.5 71.7 17.7 
0.9 3.6 8.6 68.7 18.2 
0.2 5.7 5.4 71.4 17.3 
1. 8 2.9 5.8 71.4 18.1 
0.8 3.6 4.7 72.2 18.2 
0.7 2.5 8.8 69.7 18.3 
1. 2 3.3 4.3 73.1 18.1 
0.6 2.9 6.6 72.0 17.9 
1. 4 1.6 7.5 70.9 18.6 
0.7 2.5 7.6 70.3 18.9 
1. 2 2.4 1.5 76.9 18. 1 
0.5 2.4 3.2 75.2 18.7 
1. 7 0. 1 3.5 76.4 18.3 
0.4 1.1 4.0 75.5 19.1 
0.3 1.5 2.6 76.4 19.2 
0.3 1.1 2.4 77.0 19.2 
0.5 0 .. 6 2.7 76.7 19.4 
0.0 1. 6 1.7 76.8 20.0 
0.3 1. 1 1.0 78.0 19.7 
0.0 1. 1 1.0 78.0 20.0 
0.0 0.7 0.9 78.5 20.0 
0.0 0.0 2.0 78.0 20.0 
0.3 0.0 0.0 80.0'19.7 
0.0 0.0 0.8 79.2 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.5 79.5 20.0 
•· .r•· 
Spy Ratings 
0.0 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0. 1 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.2 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.3 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.4 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.5 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.6 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.7 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.8 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
0.9 1. 0 1.0 1.0 
Average 
Score 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
3.2000 
Percentage of Outcome 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
--.. _ 
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Vita 
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